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THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF CONFUSION IN
TRADEMARK*
ALFRED C. YEN

This Article argues that consumer confusion plays a pervasive
and important role in our trademark system. This argument
directly challenges well-established orthodoxy. Numerous
Supreme Court opinions and leading academics take the position
that trademark law exists to reduce consumer confusion as much
as possible. Indeed, courts generally justify aggressive creation
and enforcement of trademark rights on the ground that these
rights reduce consumer -confusion or its economic equivalent,
consumer search costs. Unfortunately, this construction of
trademark law rests on a fundamental misunderstandingabout
how consumer confusion, the trademark system, and the
operation of markets relate to one another. In particular,
trademark orthodoxy considers consumer confusion always
harmful. Aggressive elimination of even modest confusion
therefore improves our trademark system and, by extension, the
operation of markets because such modest confusion hinders the
ability of consumers to find the goods they want. Two
observations expose the inaccuracy of this orthodoxy. First,
trademark law frequently accepts, creates, and even promotes the
very sort of modest confusion that trademark orthodoxy
despises. The ubiquitouspresence of this confusion suggests that
consumers should find their preferences seriously disrupted, but
consumers generally find the goods they prefer without undue
difficulty. Accordingly, it appearsthat modest confusion does not
disrupt markets as badly as trademarkorthodoxy states. Second,
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and more importantly, there is ample reason to think that lowlevel, modest confusion actually helps consumers avoid
confusion by teaching them to identify and distinguish
trademarks more effectively. Indeed, consumer research suggests
that exposure to confusion spurs consumers to develop and
implement cognitive strategies that avoid confusion and that
consumers become more and more adept at using these strategies
over time. This shows that trademark theory should change to
embrace, and even encourage, low levels of modest confusion in
order to improve consumer abilities and, by extension, the
operation of the trademarksystem itself.
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INTRODUCTION

In this Article, I argue that consumer confusion plays a pervasive
and important role in the proper functioning of our trademark
system. By doing so, I challenge the conventional view that trademark
law exists to reduce consumer confusion (or, in economic terms,
consumer search costs) as much as possible.' Indeed, I contend that
our trademark system will not operate well unless consumers
regularly experience manageable amounts of confusion.2 Trademark
theory should therefore be reformed to explicitly accept, and even
encourage, the presence of modest confusion in our trademark
system.
The idea advanced here leads to subtle but meaningful change in
the theoretical structure and interpretation of trademark law. Today,
conventional trademark theory is animated by what I call the
"eradicate confusion norm." This norm stands on the premise that
consumer confusion serves no constructive purpose in our trademark
system. It is always a bad thing when consumers are confused, even
slightly, and it is the purpose of trademark law to shield consumers

1. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) ("In
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
'reducels] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions'...."
(quoting J. McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 2.01[2], at 2-3 (3d ed. 1994))); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002)
("The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs....");
Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(2004) ("The influence of [trademark theory based on the reduction of consumer
confusion or search costs] is now nearly total. It has been adopted at the highest levels of
American law. No alternative account of trademark doctrine currently exists."); Robert C.
Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys in Trademark Infringement:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1013, 1018-19 (2012)
(describing the purpose of trademark law as "protect[ing] the consumer from confusion"
and "reducing consumer search costs"); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 795 (2004) (describing
trademark law as seeking to "minimize consumer search costs"); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270
(1987) ("The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by the
information or reputation that the trademark conveys."); William McGeveran & Mark P.
McKenna, Confusion Isn't Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 254 (2013)
("[C]ourts tend to view confusion itself as the ill that trademark law seeks to cure and to
assume that the optimal level of confusion is always zero."); Mark McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007)
("It would be difficult to overstate the level of consensus among commentators that the
goal of trademark law is-and always has been-to improve the quality of information in
the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs.").
2. See infra Part III.
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from such confusion. Accordingly, trademark law should try to
eradicate consumer confusion whenever possible, unless doing so
would lead to unwanted side effects like the unintended
monopolization of product features4 or burdensome restrictions on
the ability of people to accurately describe various goods and
services.'
The eradicate confusion norm rests on a very specific
understanding about consumer confusion, the operation of our
trademark system, and the proper functioning of markets. Basic
economic theory states that markets work best under conditions of
perfect information.' Ideally, consumers should instantly know
everything about goods for sale so they can immediately buy the

3. Mark McKenna offers a clear description of what I have chosen to call "the
eradicate confusion norm" in his article, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REv. 67, 69-70 (2012). He notes that, under the dominant
conceptual model of trademark, "trademark law's job is to rid the marketplace of any and
all confusion." Id. Later, after recognizing that some kinds of confusion are beyond the
reach of trademark law (such as where someone has left his keys), he describes how courts
have continually justified expansive trademark rulings in confusion and search cost terms.
Id. at 70. Accordingly, "[a]nything that can be characterized in confusion-based terms
seems to raise search costs, and if search costs are the harm to be avoided, then anything
that causes confusion ought to be at least prima facie actionable." Id. at 71.
4. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001)
(explaining the functionality doctrine, denying trademark protection if trade dress is
"essential to the use or purpose of the device" or "affects the cost or quality of the
device").
5. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118
(2004) (documenting that the fair use defense protects a defendant's ability to fairly
describe its own products even if some confusion results); New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (documenting that the nominative fair use
defense protects a defendant's ability to use a plaintiff's trademark to identify the plaintiff
or its product).
6. See ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS: AN APPLICATIONS
APPROACH 188 (6th ed. 2010) (stating that inadequate information can cause market
failure); ROBERT ERNEST HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES

AND APPLICATIONS 252 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing how, in perfectly competitive markets,
buyers have access to all relevant information); RICHARD G. LIPSEY & COLIN HARBURY,
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 154 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that perfect information is an

assumption of perfectly competitive markets); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 489-90 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing how information asymmetries are
significant sources of market failure); LIBBY RITTENBERG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS

226 (2009) (stating that perfect competition presumes buyers have complete information
about the market); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1377 (2008) ("[B]asic market
economics tells us that transparent markets with perfect information will bring about
[efficient markets].").
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items that best fit their needs.' Trademarks help create this ideal state
of affairs by acting as words or symbols that capture a wide range of
information about a product and its producer. Consumers who see a
product's mark therefore quickly learn a great deal about the
product's quality.'
According to the convention behind the eradicate confusion
norm, society needs trademark law to prevent the damage that
markets stiffer when conflicting or inaccurate meanings get associated
with marks.' This harm arises in two distinct ways. First, consumers
could become mistaken about the meaning of a mark. This happens
when rival producers use identical marks on competing goods. In
these cases, consumers cannot accurately identify the producer of
particular goods, and this can lead to mistaken purchases from the
wrong source. Second, consumers who confront conflicting or
inaccurate meanings may be able to figure out the correct meaning,
but the market's operation would still be compromised because
consumers must spend time and effort resolving ambiguities and
errors. These search costs impede the satisfaction of consumer
preferences.o Trademark law addresses these problems by preventing
7. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrinesin Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1250 (2007) ("Economists have
long recognized that the goal of facilitating the free exchange of goods requires consumers
to be able to find what they are looking for quickly and cheaply. Reducing consumer
search costs, in turn, is the primary traditional justification-and still the best one-for
having trademark law.").
8. Bird & Steckel, supra note 1, at 1019 ("A consumer can look to trademarks as
shorthand indicators of quality, prestige, or product attributes."); Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 1, at 787 ("Rather than having to inquire into the provenance and qualities of every
potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as shorthand indicators.").
9. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (stating that
trademark law reduces consumer search costs because it "quickly and easily assures a
potential customer that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer
as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past"); Ty Inc. v.
Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The fundamental purpose of a trademark is
to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the
particular source of particular goods.").
10. See Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer
Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 109 (2004)
(describing how temporary initial confusion can increase consumer search costs); Ariel
Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks,2010 B.U.
L. REV. 1555, 1580-87 (2010) (discussing the search costs associated with multiple
meanings for trademarks); Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 761, 807 (2013) (describing how even momentary confusion can increase consumer
search costs); see also Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511 (explaining trademark dilution by noting
that consumers will have to "think harder" when confronting multiple meanings for
trademarks, creating a higher "imagination cost").
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behavior that leads to confusion, broadly defined, about the meaning
of marks. Because perfect information leads to the proper functioning
of markets, shielding consumers from any doubt or delay about the
meaning of a mark presumably helps markets work better." It
therefore makes sense to eradicate consumer confusion whenever

possible.12
The eradicate confusion norm exerts great influence over
contemporary trademark law. Courts and theorists alike constantly
state that the purpose of trademark law is the reduction of consumer
search costs, a term synonymous with reducing consumer confusion."
More importantly, the eradicate confusion norm provides vital
support for an expansive, but often controversial, interpretation of
trademark rights. 4 On the one hand, some judges allow trademark
Some actions involving ambiguous meanings for trademarks may be
simultaneously characterized as traditional trademark infringement that depends on the
existence of confusion and trademark dilution that does not depend on confusion. J.
MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §24:72 (4th
ed.) (describing dilution as a distinct action not dependent on consumer confusion). There
is considerable scholarly debate about whether trademark dilution, particularly blurring, is
merely a specific form of trademark infringement actually based on confusion. See id. at
nn.15-16. Even if dilution is correctly understood as distinct from traditional trademark
infringement, it is important to note that traditional infringement and dilution actions are
generally asserted together on the same facts. As Glynn Lunney writes,
In virtually all of the cases, state and federal, that have been litigated since
Massachusetts first adopted a dilution statute in 1947, the two causes of action,
dilution and trademark infringement, are resolved identically.... Over the past
sixty years, there are only a relative handful of cases where the two causes of
action are resolved differently.
GLYNN LUNNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK LAw 474 (2010). The near

unity of results shared by dilution and traditional infringement make search-cost-based
explanations of dilution fully applicable to many traditional infringement cases.
11. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination,69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 833 (2004) ("The orthodox justification for protecting trademarks is that
trademarks enhance the efficient functioning of a competitive marketplace by ensuring
that consumers can either find goods from the same source as goods they have enjoyed
previously, or can find goods whose reputation has been advanced through advertising.");
Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414
(2010) ("When it works well, trademark law facilitates the workings of modern markets by
permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the quality of their
products to buyers . . . .").
12. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 1, at 254 (referring to judicial
assumptions that trademark law should optimally eliminate confusion completely).
13. See supra note 1.
14. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907 (2007) (stating that courts' broad interpretations of confusion
cause trademark users to become progressively more risk averse, influencing the very
consumer norms courts incorporate into infringement analysis); Katz, supra note 10, at
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holders to prevent only confusion that causes consumers to
mistakenly purchase one producer's goods in favor of another's
goods." On the other hand, modern courts generally allow trademark
holders to prevent modest or speculative confusion that is unlikely to
result in mistaken purchases.' 6 For example, it is apparently
trademark infringement to use the title "Dairy Queens" for a satirical
movie about beauty pageants in rural Minnesota because it makes
consumers think of the Dairy Queen restaurant chain," and it is also
infringement for a travel company to entitle itself "G.A.P.
Adventures" (an acronym for "great adventure people") because that
name will trigger memories of the GAP clothing company.' 8 These
decisions get criticized as misapplications of trademark law," but they
continue to flourish, and even multiply,20 because the eradicate
1587 ("[T]he focus on minimizing search costs as the sole purpose of trademark law
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the first adopter of any trademark should be given
an exclusive right to it regardless of context, because any additional use might increase
someone's search cost."); McKenna, supra note 1, at 1899 ("[Mjodern trademark law
essentially instantiates a one-way ratchet to broader trademark rights."); Michael S.
Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and Interests
in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 428-30 (2011) (describing the "enormous[]"
expansion of trademark law).
15. For the seminal citation for this proposition, see Borden Ice Cream Co. v.
Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912), which held that the
defendant did not infringe the Borden mark owned by the plaintiff because condensed

milk and ice cream sales do not substitute for one another. For further examples of
instances in which courts held that products would not cause consumers to mistakenly
purchase the wrong product, see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 73-109 and accompanying text.
17. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732-35 (D.
Minn. 1998).
18. The GAP, Inc. v. G.A.P. Adventures, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 9614(AKH), 2011 WL
2946384, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 24,2011).
19. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 11, at 860-61 (questioning whether the public truly
benefits from constructions of consumer behavior that result in enlarged trademark
rights); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761-93 (2004)
(arguing that courts make inappropriate assumptions about how easily consumers will be
confused, leading to the expansion of trademark rights in ways that do not benefit
consumers); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV.
427,439-42 (2010) (questioning decisions that expand the scope of copyright by portraying
consumers as easily fooled); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 426-27 (criticizing
cases that expand the scope of trademark infringement); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999) (criticizing expanded "property-based"
theories of trademarks as detached from trademarks' traditional and sensible focus);
Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark
Law, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 105, 121-22 (2005) (criticizing development and expansion of
initial interest confusion).
20. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen Corp. of Am., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant who made keychains bearing the logo of
plaintiff Volkswagen committed infringement despite including disclaimers denying any
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confusion norm powerfully connects the elimination of even minor
consumer confusion to the generally accepted purpose of trademark
law.2 1
I believe that the eradicate confusion norm fundamentally
misunderstands the relationship between confusion and the operation
of our trademark system. I also believe that it is a mistake to treat
consumer confusion as something that must be eliminated in order to
properly support commercial markets. My skepticism arises from two
sources.
First, despite conventional trademark theory's supposed zeal for
eliminating consumer confusion, the law itself frequently accepts,
creates, and even welcomes consumer confusion.22 In some cases,
confusion arises because trademark law concerns itself with facts that
can exist only after consumers have faced confusion." At other times,
confusion occurs because the very process of creating, assigning, and
enforcing trademark rights opens the door to confusion.24 At still
other times, trademark law explicitly accepts some degree of
consumer confusion.25 If the conventional understanding about
confusion were indeed correct, such ubiquitous confusion should
seriously disrupt consumer markets. Of course, such disruption does
not occur. Consumers generally find the goods they want, and this
implies that some level of confusion does not compromise the
operation of markets as trademark convention holds.
connection with Volkswagen); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the estate of Elvis Presley had a trademark violation claim against
proprietors of an establishment called "The Velvet Elvis"); Lettuce Entertain You
Enters., Inc. v. Leila Sophia AR, L.L.C., 703 F. Supp. 2d 777, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding
that the plaintiff, Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc., should be granted a preliminary
injunction against a defendant operating restaurant under the name "Lettuce Mix" despite
the fact that the plaintiff operated no restaurants using the word "lettuce" in the names);
Toho Co. v. William Morrow and Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
that the maker of Godzilla movies and merchandise had a trademark violation claim
against a publisher for titling a book "Godzilla!"); Nailtiques Cosmetics Corp. v. Salon Sci.
Corp., No. 96-2709-DIV-NESBITT, 1997 WL 244746, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff, seller of "Nailtiques" fingernail care products, should be
granted an injunction against the defendant for selling "Pro-Techniques" fingernail care
products).
21. See McKenna, supra note 3, at 79 (suggesting that the connection between search
costs theory and consumer confusion has "manifested itself primarily in courts[] fetishizing
confusion and feeling compelled to respond whenever mark owners can characterize a
defendant's use in confusion-based terms").
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 134-88 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.C.
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Second, there is ample reason to believe that modest levels of
confusion actually help consumers develop cognitive skills that avoid
confusion in ways that, in at least some instances, improve the
operation of our trademark system. Remember, trademark law's very
focus on consumer confusion implies that consumers have cognitive
skills that make it possible to identify and distinguish trademarks.2 6
Furthermore, although these skills may be based on inherent, hardwired neurological characteristics of the human brain, it is important
to understand that they do not arise in a vacuum divorced from
trademark law. Instead, they develop precisely because consumers
encounter confusion and learn how to deal with it.
To use a metaphor with which we are all familiar, people are not
born knowing how to read. Once people learn how to read basic
works, they become more able readers by encountering and adapting
to the challenges presented by more complicated texts. These
complicated texts initially confuse readers, but readers adapt by
developing skills that make comprehension possible. Over time, this
process gives readers the ability to understand subtle and nuanced
messages embedded in complicated texts.27 This ability could not exist
without the struggles inherent in learning how to handle sophisticated
"confusing" texts, and-more importantly-this ability is vital to the
existence and maintenance of effective written communication.
Without this process, the vast majority of people would have only
low-level reading skills, and many sophisticated, complicated texts
would lose social value because people would not be able to
understand them. Indeed, most people would find those texts
confusing.
Things are no different for trademarks. Trademarks often take
the form of written texts, and consumers surely are not born knowing
what a trademark is. Consumers therefore develop the ability to
identify and distinguish trademarks by learning from life-long
exposure to trademarks, whose existence and features trademark law
prescribes.2 8 In effect, consumers learn to "read" trademarks by
experience, and they get better and better at it with practice, which

26. If consumers did not have these skills, it would be pointless for the law to attempt
to eliminate confusion because consumers who lack the ability to identify and distinguish
trademarks are, by definition, always confused. Eliminating confusion can therefore
happen only if consumers have enough cognitive skill to at least sometimes understand the
trademarks they see.
27. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 216-69 and accompanying text.
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includes encounters with confusing situations. This developed skill
supports the operation of an effective trademark system.29
For example, if there were no legal protection for trademarks,
consumers would react to them cautiously because trademarks, at
least as we know them, would not reliably indicate the source of
goods since more than one producer could be using the mark. Of
course, once trademark protection exists, only one producer can use a
given mark, and it becomes a reliable source indicator. Consumers
would experience this and adopt trademarks as proof of authenticity.
Similarly, if trademark law permitted producers to use similar marks
that are distinguishable with modest attention, consumers would learn
to pay reasonable attention to the details of marks. By contrast, if
producers were legally required to use marks that bear no
resemblance to each other, consumers would learn that the details of
marks are unimportant and behave accordingly.
Once we recognize that consumers respond to trademark law, it
becomes possible to understand why exposing consumers to
confusion does not necessarily harm the trademark system. To the
contrary, some degree of confusion is valuable-and even
necessary-because it teaches consumers to identify and distinguish
trademarks. This is important because consumers who improve these
skills become less easily confused about the meaning of trademarks.
Even better, those consumers generally develop a sophisticated
understanding of trademarks that enables the trademark system to
convey better information to consumers through the equivalent of
sophisticated texts. In short, we should not theorize trademark law as
a shield that protects consumers from all instances of confusion.
Instead, we should think of trademark law as a tool for managing
confusion in ways that help consumers develop the cognitive skills
necessary to support a complex market economy. It makes good sense
for trademark law to prevent confusion when the confusion is so
serious that consumers probably will not straighten things out on their
own. In situations like this, meaningful disruption to markets is
relatively likely, and this disruption will probably outweigh the
benefits of any increase in consumers' cognitive skills that results
from exposure to confusion. By contrast, it makes little sense for
trademark law to intervene when consumers face minor confusion
that they likely will resolve on their own. In these situations, the
29. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 654-55 (2009) (arguing that
trademarks rely on the consumer's "associational dexterity" to work).
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likelihood of meaningful disruption to markets is low, so society will
probably gain overall by tolerating minor confusion in exchange for
the benefits that arise from consumers' exposure to confusion.
Unfortunately, modern trademark convention discourages
thinking about trademark law this way because it relies so heavily on
the eradicate confusion norm.' Judicial opinions occasionally
recognize that trademark decisions can shape consumer expectations
over the long run," but this has led to neither a systematic description
of how consumer confusion in trademark affects consumers nor open
consideration of how confusion can affect consumer behavior in
socially beneficial ways. Instead, courts have frequently acted to
eliminate rather modest instances of confusion on the understandable
but mistaken premise that complete eradication of consumer
confusion serves the public interest.32 These instances of confusion
are often precisely the ones that would otherwise teach consumers to
become more sophisticated users of trademarks.
In the pages that follow, I will describe how confusion educates
consumers about trademarks and how modest confusion supports the
operation of our trademark system. Part I describes trademark's
conventional emphasis on the immediate elimination of consumer
confusion. Part II shows that trademark law frequently permits and
even embraces consumer confusion. Borrowing insights from research
about consumer learning, Part III analyzes how the confusion
identified in Part II affects consumers.3 3 Part IV discusses how the
30. A few commentators have recognized the possibility that confusion may benefit
the trademark system or that trademark can alter consumer behavior. They have not,
however, pursued the implications of this realization in more than a preliminary way. See
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 438-39 (noting the danger that "coddling
consumers" may make them even more prone to confusion); McGeveran & McKenna,
supra note 1, at 254 (recognizing that a small amount of confusion may lead to increased
consumer understanding).
31. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1509
(10th Cir. 1995) ("[Cionsumer confusion resulting from the copying of product features is,
in some measure, a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the degree that useful product
configurations are protected as identifiers, consumers will come to rely on them for that
purpose, but if copying is allowed, they will depend less on product shapes and more on
labels and packaging.").
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. Other articles have used research about consumers to shed light on our trademark
system, albeit for reasons other than exploring how consumers learn from confusion. See,
e.g., Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary
Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion, and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1014
(2001) (applying knowledge borrowed from cognitive psychology and consumer research
to various trademark-law doctrines); Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric C.
DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and The Sophisticated Consumer, 57
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beneficial effects of confusion imply that trademark should change its
focus from simply eliminating confusion to managing confusion in
ways that help consumers develop the skills they need to navigate
modern marketplaces effectively.
I. THE ROLE AND EFFECT OF THE ERADICATE CONFUSION NORM

Our inquiry begins by describing how the eradicate confusion
norm and its associated understandings influence modern trademark
law. As this Part shows, the norm and its emphasis on shielding
consumers both describe and justify important and sometimes
controversial expansions of modern trademark rights. First, I will
describe how courts use the eradicate confusion norm to extend the
scope of trademark's subject matter well beyond what is necessary to
permit the accurate identification of goods. Second, I will show how
the norm identifies a form of actionable confusion that supports the
imposition of trademark liability even when consumers are not
confused about the source of goods they buy. In both of these areas,
the argument is the same: trademark rights must be broad because
the law should, per the eradicate confusion norm, wipe out all
possibility of even fleeting consumer confusion.
A.

Subject Matter

Although the law grants trademark protection to words, logos,
and even product features that producers use to identify and
distinguish their products,' producers do not get rights to every mark
they propose.35 Because trademark protection rests on a mark's
EMORY L.J. 575, 620-22 (2008) (using research about consumers to analyze judicial

interpretation of consumer sophistication in the context of trademark infringement); Mark
P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63,
114-15 (2009) (using marketing studies to support the argument that lower-quality brand
extensions do not generally harm the core brand's reputation); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing
Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1253 (2011) (using consumer research to argue that
branding alters how consumers evaluate product information and consumption
experiences); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 510-11 (2008) (using consumer research to criticize broad
dilution protection).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... used by a person ... to identify and
distinguish his or her goods .. .from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods...."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9
(1995) ("A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device,, or other designation, or a
combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person's goods or services
and ... distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.").
35. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
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ability to identify and distinguish one producer's goods from
another's, a mark does not receive protection unless it identifies a
particular source for a good or, in trademark parlance, is
"distinctive." 6 Some proposed marks are automatically protected as
"inherently distinctive" because their "intrinsic nature[s] serve[] to
identify a particular source of a product."37 Inherently distinctive
marks include word marks that are " 'arbitrary' ('Camel' cigarettes),
'fanciful' ('Kodak' film), or 'suggestive' ('Tide' laundry detergent),"3
as well as logos and packaging. 39
By contrast, some other proposed marks do not receive
automatic protection because it is unclear whether they actually
identify a source.40 However, these marks will receive protection if the
user of the mark can establish distinctiveness.4 1 For example, a
clothing manufacturer may decide to market a line of "Safari"
clothing.42 Consumers could identify that clothing as the type worn by
people on safaris,43 or they could identify it as clothing coming from a
specific manufacturer." Similarly, a shoe manufacturer may decide to
use a specific color in the design of its shoe.45 Consumers might buy

36. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) ("The general
rule regarding distinctiveness is clear: An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of
being protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning.").
37. Id. at 768; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara.Bros., 529 U.S. 205,210 (2000)
(citing and quoting Two Pesos with approval).
38. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 210-11 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
39. See id. at 209, 212 (noting that the Nike swoosh can be registered as a trademark
and explaining that product packaging is often inherently distinctive); Star Indus., Inc. v.
Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 383 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the plaintiff's Star "0" design
logo to be inherently distinctive).
40. See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding no reason to extend trademark protection to marks that lack the ability to identify
a source).
41. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (explaining how marks lacking inherent
distinctiveness can still gain protection).
42. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976)
(stating that the plaintiff used the mark "Safari" on various clothing and shoes).
43. See id. at 8 (describing the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs use of "Safari"
was "merely descriptive").
44. See id. at 13-14 (holding that "Safari" is not merely descriptive when used on
some items, including shoes, and therefore eligible for trademark protection).
45. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing how the plaintiff painted the outsole of its shoes in a
particular shade of red).
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the shoe because they find the color attractive," or they might do so
because it signifies the manufacturer. 7 In cases like this, trademark
protection exists only upon a showing that consumers have come to
understand the proposed mark as a source identifier.' Marks for
which such a showing has been made are sometimes said to exhibit
"acquired distinctiveness."4 9
The wisdom of allowing acquired distinctiveness to establish
trademark protection is far from obvious because trademark
protection for marks that lack inherent distinctiveness can harm free
market competition. If one clothing maker successfully monopolizes
the use of "Safari" to describe clothing, rivals producing similar
clothes will lose the ability to fairly describe their goods. And, to the
extent that only one shoemaker can use red on the soles of its shoes,
others may find it difficult to offer a competing product for sale at all.
This would ultimately harm consumers because the trademark holder
would leverage its trademark rights into a monopoly over red-soled
shoes. 0
These problems suggest that trademark law ought to protect only
inherently distinctive marks." If the law did this, then producers who
care about the benefits of trademark protection would use only
inherently distinctive marks. Consumers would find it easy to identify
new marks, and the anti-competitive effects outlined above would
disappear.
Concerns about free competition do lead to a few limits on the
scope of trademark's subject matter. Trademark law will not protect a
46. See id. at 222 (noting that ornamental features are not protected as trademarks
when consumers desire the feature and granting exclusive rights would unduly hinder
competition).
47. See id. at 226-27 (stating that consumers associate red-soled shoes with the
plaintiff).
48. See id. at 225-26 (holding that painting the soles of shoes red could be protected
as a trademark if consumers understood that feature as an indicator of source); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(b) (1995) (noting that a mark can
become distinctive if consumers understand it as a source identifier); infra notes 55-67 and
accompanying text (allowing trademark protection for color based on proof that it had
become a source identifier).
49. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (explaining
that marks that gain acquired distinctiveness are protected); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (offering the same explanation provided by
the Court in Wal-Mart Stores).
50. See Lunney, supra note 19, at 421-31 (describing the welfare consequences of
monopolies associated with trademark law).
51. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995) (recognizing but
rejecting the argument against granting protection to marks lacking inherent
distinctiveness).
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word mark when competitors genuinely need to use a word to
describe their products." Similarly, it will not protect a product
feature as a mark when the feature is functional and therefore
essential to product quality.53 On the whole, however, trademark law
generally looks past competition-related concerns and grants
protection quite freely upon showings of acquired distinctiveness
because courts believe that doing so protects consumers from
confusion.5 4
The Supreme Court provided a clear example of such reasoning
in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co.," a case in which the Court

considered whether trademark law protects color.16 The Qualitex facts
were entirely typical. For forty years, the plaintiff, Qualitex, had used
a particular shade of green-gold on its dry-cleaning press pads.',
When the defendant, Jacobsen, began selling pads in a similar color,
Qualitex sued for trademark infringement." Qualitex prevailed in the
district court, but the Ninth Circuit ruled in Jacobsen's favor on the
grounds that color alone was ineligible for trademark protection."
Qualitex appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
there is no rule barring trademark protection for a color.'
52. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (holding that
"shredded wheat" is a generic term as applied to cereal and cannot be protected because it
is "the term by which [the cereal] is generally known by the public"); Boston Duck Tours,
L.P. v. Super Duck Tours, L.L.C., 531 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the phrase
"duck tour" was generic for sight-seeing tours using an amphibious vehicle); Harley
Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that Harley
Davidson had no exclusive right to the term "hog" when used to describe large
motorcycles); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the maker of Honey-Brown Ale could not stop other beer producers from
using the term "honey-brown" to describe their ales); Classic Foods Int'l Corp. v. Kettle
Foods, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1182-83 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that the maker of
Kettle Chips could not prohibit other chip producers from using "kettle" to describe chips
that have been or appear to have been cooked in a kettle); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at
§ 12:1 (noting that a generic name of a product cannot serve as a mark).
53. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (finding that a product feature is functional and
cannot be protected if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost
or quality of the article); see also Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,
32-34 (2001) (applying Qualitex to find a dual-spring design mechanism on temporary
road and outdoor signs to be functional); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 7:63 (noting that
when a product feature is utilitarian, or functional, it will not be protected).
54. See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
55. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
56. Id. at 160-61.
57. Id. at 161.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 161-62.
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In so ruling, the Court considered and rejected the arguments
against trademark protection for marks lacking inherent
distinctiveness. Justice Breyer's majority opinion recognized that
consumers do not naturally treat color as a source identifier 6 2 and that
protecting colors could damage free competition because consumers
sometimes want products in certain colors for reasons unrelated to
source identification. 6' Nevertheless, it implicitly embraced the
eradicate confusion norm, stating that these concerns did not warrant
categorically denying trademark protection to color because,
according to the Court, doing so would permit consumer confusion.'
If consumers had learned to use a color as a source identifier, denying
trademark protection to that color would have the same effect as
denying protection to an inherently distinctive mark.65 Either way,
consumers would be confused, and trademark's very purpose is to
prevent that confusion.66 The Court therefore allowed trademark
protection for color upon proof of acquired distinctiveness. 6
Numerous other courts have used similar reasoning to extend
trademark protection to words and product features that lack
inherent distinctiveness.68 Together, these cases show that
61. Id. at 162-69.
62. Id. at 162-63 ("[A] product's color is unlike 'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive'
words or designs, which almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand."
(quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir.
1976))).
63. Id. at 165.
64. Id. at 163-66.
65. Id. at 163 ("[Olver time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a
product or its packaging ... as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have come
to identify and distinguish the goods-i.e., 'to indicate' their 'source'-much in the way
that descriptive words on a product ... can come to indicate a product's origin.").
66. Id. at 163-64 (describing the basic purpose of trademark as reducing consumer
search costs and finding the protection of color fully consistent with that purpose).
67. Id. at 164 ("It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark-not its ontological
status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign-that permits it to serve [trademark's] basic
purposes. And, for that reason, it is difficult to find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason
to disqualify absolutely the use of a color as a mark." (citation omitted)).
68. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the university's color
schemes acquired distinctiveness and were therefore protectable); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 419-20 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the grill design for a
vehicle had acquired distinctiveness and was therefore protectable); Ferrari S.P.A. v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that the shape of cars had
acquired distinctiveness and was therefore protectable); Schmidt v. Quigg, 609 F. Supp.
227, 230-31 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that "honey baked" had acquired distinctiveness
and was therefore protectable when used as mark on ham); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211-12 (2000) (citing Qualitex with approval and holding
that product design is protectable upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness).
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conventional trademark theory and the eradicate confusion norm
support protection for a broad range of marks for the stated purpose
of shielding consumers from as much confusion as possible.
B.

Basic Trademark Infringement

Trademark infringement exists when a defendant's behavior
creates a "likelihood of consumer confusion.""9 As one might
imagine, the precise meaning of confusion is unclear and contested.
At one end of the spectrum, it has been held that infringing confusion
exists only when consumers might mistakenly buy the defendant's
products instead of the plaintiff's. 0 At the other end of the spectrum,
many courts have held that infringing confusion can exist even when
there is no meaningful risk of a mistaken purchase." Instead, a
plaintiff can establish infringement by showing only that more than
one association for a mark enters a consumer's mind.n
To appreciate the difference between these understandings of
confusion and the role of the eradicate confusion norm, let us begin
with Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.1 3 In that case, the
plaintiff Aunt Jemima sold self-rising flour under the mark "Aunt
Jemima's," and the defendant Rigney sold pancake syrup and sugar
cream under the identical mark.7 4 When negotiations about the
possible joint use of the mark to sell pancake flour apparently

69. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (imposing liability on those using a mark in a
manner "likely to cause confusion" about the source or sponsorship of goods); Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) ("It is, of course, also undisputed that
[trademark or trade dress liability] requires proof of the likelihood of confusion.");
Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff must prove likelihood of confusion to prevail in a
trademark infringement case); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20
(1995) (imposing liability on a trademark defendant whose.use of a mark causes a
"likelihood of confusion").
70. See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513-14
(7th Cir. 1912) (holding that the defendant's use of the "Borden" mark to sell ice cream
did not infringe on the plaintiff's use of the "Borden" mark to sell condensed milk because
the two products were not substitutes for one another, and therefore consumers could not
mistakenly buy the defendant's goods instead of the plaintiffs).
71. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410-12 (2d Cir. 1917).
72. See infra notes 78-111 and accompanying text; see also Gerhardt,supra note 19, at
439-42 (describing cases where courts supported questionable findings of infringement by
portraying consumers as easily fooled); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 422-26
(describing the narrow scope of trademark infringement in the early twentieth century and
its subsequent expansion).
73. 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
74. Id. at 408.
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foundered, Aunt Jemima sued Rigney for trademark infringement."
Although it is easy to imagine that consumers might have thought
that the same manufacturer made pancake flour and syrup, the
district court ruled against Aunt Jemima. 6 The rationale for doing so
reflected a very narrow understanding of consumer confusion,
extending protection to plaintiffs only when a defendant's use of a
confusing mark directly diverted sales that the plaintiff would have
otherwise enjoyed. This meant that the district court had to rule in
favor of the defendant because sales of syrup and sugar cream do not
replace sales of flour." The Second Circuit, however, reversed and
found in Aunt Jemima's favor.7 In so ruling, the court articulated
reasons for broadening trademark's scope. As an initial matter, the
court objected to the defendant's attempt "either to get the benefit of
the complainant's reputation or of its advertisement or to forestall the
extension of its trade."" Additionally, the court noted that syrup and
flour are commonly used together and that consumers could easily
believe that syrup marketed under the Aunt Jemima's mark was
actually made by the plaintiff.'
Two distinct interpretations of the Second Circuit's Aunt Jemima
decision exist. First, the court might simply have been recognizing
that two manufacturers who do not presently compete might do so in
the future. If such competition is reasonably foreseeable, then simple
consumer uncertainty about the meaning of marks used by the
manufacturers could easily turn into the mistaken substitutions
considered actionable by the district court. Preventing this would
represent a fairly straightforward extension of the district court's
guiding rationale. Second, the court might have been altering the
meaning of consumer confusion by separating it from the risk of
mistaken substitution. Note the court's objection to the defendant
getting "the benefit of the complainant's reputation or of its
advertisement or to forestall the extension of its trade,"' something
75. See id. at 408-09.
76. Id. at 408.
77. Id. at 409 (noting the district court's view that "no one wanting syrup could
possibly be made to take flour"); see also Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed
Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912) (holding that the defendant did not infringe the
Borden mark owned by the plaintiff because condensed milk and ice cream sales did not
substitute for one another).
78. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 412 (reversing the district court and granting
injunctive relief to the plaintiff).
79. Id. at 409.
80. Id. at 409-10.
81. See id. at 409.
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apparently considered undesirable even though it carried no risk of
substitution.
It is of course impossible to know exactly what the Aunt Jemima
court intended. Although some courts continue to anchor trademark
infringement to some meaningful likelihood of consumer mistake
about the source of goods," it is clear that modern courts have
generally followed the second understanding of Aunt Jemima and
have found trademark infringement even when there is little risk of
confusion about the maker of the goods."
For example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,'

the plaintiff, Mobil Oil, made wide use of its red-flying-horse mark in
conjunction with a wide range of petroleum products and services.'
Mobil sued the defendant, Pegasus Petroleum, contending that the
use of "Pegasus" in conjunction with the defendant's oil trading
business infringed the flying-horse mark. The Second Circuit agreed,
finding that the defendant's use of "Pegasus" created a likelihood of
confusion. In this case, the possibility of mistaken purchases from
Pegasus was effectively nonexistent. As the Second Circuit noted,
Pegasus Petroleum restricted its business to oil trading, never selling
to ordinary consumers." Since oil traders are relatively sophisticated
buyers who know the players in their industry," it was highly unlikely
that anyone would ever buy oil from Pegasus Petroleum under the
mistaken belief that she was doing business with Mobil Oil. The
Second Circuit understood this, and it made no serious claim that
82. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel L.L.C., 293 F.3d 550, 555 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that there was no likelihood of confusion between New York $lot
Exchange slot machine games in casinos and the New York Stock Exchange); Nabisco,
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Dentyne Ice was
not likely to cause confusion with Ice Breakers breath-freshening gum); Estee Lauder, Inc.
v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1505 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Gap's 100% Body Care
line of products was not likely to cause confusion with Estee Lauder's 100% high
technology facial moisturizer); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 973 F.2d
1033, 1033 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that there was no likelihood of confusion between
Excedrin PM and Tylenol PM, despite similar trade dress); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc.
v. Nature Labs, L.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that Timmy
Holedigger dog perfume was not likely to cause confusion with the Tommy Hilfiger
mark); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 427 (arguing for limiting actionable
confusion to cases involving consumer error about facts material to purchasing decisions).
83. Gerhardt, supra note 19, at 439-40.
84. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 255.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 260.
88. Id.
89. See id.
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Pegasus Petroleum's behavior would divert any sales from Mobil.
Instead, the court found a likelihood of confusion because Pegasus
Petroleum's mark would remind people of Mobil,' giving Pegasus
commercial credibility not because oil traders believed that Pegasus
was formally affiliated with Mobil, but because there was a possibility
of such association that purchasers would have to consider briefly and
dismiss."
Similarly, in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co.,92 the

plaintiff, Beer Nuts, sold mixed nuts under the name "Beer Nuts,"93
and it sued the defendant, Clover Club, for selling its own mixed nuts
under the name "Brew Nuts."94 Because "Beer Nuts" differs from
"Brew Nuts," one could easily imagine a court finding that Clover
Club caused no likelihood of confusion, and the district court so
found." However, the Tenth Circuit reversed. 6 The circuit court
acknowledged that clear differences between the two marks existed.97
Nevertheless, the court stated that the general similarities mattered
more than these differences." Among other things, the words "beer"
and "brew" both contained four letters, began with "b," and were
synonyms for beer." According to the court, a likelihood of confusion
was particularly likely because consumers were unlikely to pay
attention to small differences like these when buying nuts."
Beer Nuts is hard to understand if liability rested on a reasonable
probability that consumers would buy Brew Nuts thinking that they
would be doing business with Beer Nuts. Although portions of the
opinion claim (rather unconvincingly) that consumers would make
this very mistake,o'0 it is unlikely that consumers truly could not
distinguish Beer Nuts from Brew Nuts. Beer Nuts makes much more
sense, however, if emphasis is given to the portions of the opinion
suggesting that Brew Nuts became associated with Beer Nuts because
90. Id. at 257 (quoting with approval the district court's statement that "the word
'Pegasus' evokes the symbol of the flying horse").
91. Id. at 259.
92. 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 922.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 923. Indeed, the district court found no likelihood of confusion on two
separate occasions. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 926.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 926-27 ("[T]he district court should have concluded that the two products
are purchased with little care and are thus likely to be confused.").
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both are mixed nuts that go with beer. As the court noted, the mark
"Beer Nuts" tied one producer's mixed nuts to beer." Accordingly,
when Clover Club used the mark "Brew Nuts," it also associated its
nuts with beer and raised the possibility that consumers would think
of Beer Nuts upon encountering Brew Nuts."o3 This created the risk
that some of Beer Nuts' reputation would "rub off" on Brew Nuts
even though consumers knew that the two were distinct products
made by different manufacturers.
Finally, in American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line
Productions, Inc.," a Minnesota district court found a likelihood of

confusion when the Dairy Queen fast food chain sued the producer of
a movie entitled "Dairy Queens," which satirized beauty pageants
held in rural Minnesota.os Some of the satire involved off-color
humor." If the court believed that trademark law only protects
against consumers mistakenly buying goods from the wrong producer,
then liability would not have existed, for it is highly unlikely that
moviegoers would see a movie entitled "Dairy Queens" thinking it
was made by the Dairy Queen restaurant chain. However, if
trademark's concerns include the possibility that consumers will
associate multiple meanings with a trademark, then liability makes
sense. After all, the "Dairy Queens" title would probably remind
many consumers of the restaurant chain. Those consumers would
then simultaneously think of the movie, its satirical off-color content,
the restaurant chain, and its food. This would force consumers to
spend time and effort untangling all of these associations with "Dairy
Queens" and "Dairy Queen" when going to see the movie or eat at
the restaurant chain. Not surprisingly, the American Dairy Queen
court expressed concern about the possibility of multiple
associations.' 7 According to the court, "[American Dairy Queen] is
particularly concerned that the title 'Dairy Queens' will cause the
public to associate its trademarked name with the unwholesome
content of the film. [American Dairy Queen] fears this association
will create negative impressions and confuse its customers, thereby

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 926.
See id.
35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
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demeaning and disparaging its mark."" This led to the court's finding
that a likelihood of confusion existed.1"9
Cases like Pegasus Petroleum, Brew Nuts, and American Dairy

Queenti0 pose significant challenges to modern trademark law
because, according to these cases, liability exists only when the
defendant's behavior creates a likelihood of consumer confusion."' If
modern trademark law were to restrict infringement to cases in which
a reasonable chance of mistaken substitution exists, then it would be
easy to see why consumer confusion exists and why preventing it
makes sense. However, when infringement includes cases in which the
risk of substitution is very small, the existence of confusion becomes
questionable. If consumers do not make mistaken purchases, how
have they been confused? And, if they have not been confused, why
does trademark law impose liability? The eradicate confusion norm
answers these questions. As the norm holds, markets work correctly
when consumers can instantly identify the goods they want."2
Whenever consumers even temporarily associate a trademark with
something other than the trademark holder or its goods, the process
of identification is disrupted."I Such disruption compromises markets,
and trademark law should therefore eradicate this confusion to help
markets operate smoothly, even when there is no meaningful risk of
mistaken consumer purchases.1 4 This conclusion implies that cases

108. Id. at 729.
109. Id. at 732.
110. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405,414 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the grill of a toy car manufactured by the defendant was likely to cause
confusion with General Motors's Hummer grill mark); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.
v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that in Debbie Does
Dallas, a pornographic movie, the uniform worn resembled the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders outfits and was likely to cause confusion); HMH Pub. Co. v. Brincat, 504
F.2d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the defendant's unincorporated automobile
services business selling dune buggy parts and providing towing services under the Playboy
name was likely to be confused with the famous pornography distributor); McDonald's
Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
that there could be confusion between the plaintiff's McDonald's restaurant and the
defendant's McDental dental services organization); John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Bethea,
305 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (D.S.C. 1969) (holding that a Johnnie Walker motel was likely to
cause confusion with the famous scotch purveyor of the same name).
111. See supra note 69.
112. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 3; see also Austin, supra note 11, at 896-98 (identifying how
trademark law sometimes recognizes. legal harm when a consumer merely considers the
wrong brand without making a mistaken purchase); Deven R. Desai, Response: An
Information Approach to Trademarks, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2122 (2012) (arguing that the
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like Pegasus Petroleum, Beer Nuts, and American Dairy Queen were

all correctly decided.
The eradicate confusion norm seemingly offers a theoretically
coherent and powerful foundation for modern trademark law. There
is a seductive elegance to the norm's explanation of how even slight
confusion harms the public interest, and it is easy to understand why
courts and theorists place the elimination of consumer confusion at
the center of modern trademark theory."' It is therefore quite
interesting and instructive to note that many areas of trademark law
appear inconsistent with the eradicate confusion norm. As the next
Part will discuss, those areas of trademark law accept and even
encourage consumer confusion, and they often do so because such
confusion advances the public interest. This contrast draws the
descriptive and normative values of the eradicate confusion norm into
question.
II. PERSISTENT AND INEVITABLE CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK

The above-described aversion to consumer confusion implies
that trademark law should prohibit even relatively small instances of
confusion wherever possible. Curiously, however, trademark law does
not consistently pursue this objective. Although courts have
expanded the subject matter and scope of trademark rights for the
stated purpose of eliminating consumer confusion, there are many
instances in which the law accepts and even encourages the very
confusion that trademark convention and the eradicate confusion
norm find so odious. This happens in three ways. First, trademark
decisions often depend on facts that exist only after consumers have
faced confusion. Second, trademark law operates in ways that are
almost certain to create consumer confusion. Third, courts sometimes
explicitly decline opportunities to reduce confusion. I will now
describe this persistent and, in some cases, inevitable confusion in
trademark in order to question conventional wisdom about the role of
confusion in our trademark system.

trademark system now operates to maintain "a singular, consistent meaning" for every
trademark).
115. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Decisions Based on Facts That Exist Only After Consumer
Confusion

1. Another Look at Acquired Distinctiveness
In Part I, we saw that trademark law protects certain marks only
after they acquire distinctiveness. The reason for this protection is
simple. As Qualitex"6 explained, failure to protect a mark after it
gains distinctiveness would mean allowing consumers to be
confused.'" This reasoning clearly establishes a strong connection
between protecting marks that become distinctive and preventing
consumer confusion." 8 Interestingly, however, the very process of
protecting marks that become distinctive also involves confusing
consumers and having consumers overcome that confusion. Indeed,
consumer confusion is a prerequisite to the protection of marks that
acquire distinctiveness.
. A mark lacks inherent distinctiveness when consumers do not
instantly recognize it as a source identifier. Consumers already give
meanings other than source identification to proposed marks like
"Safari" because the marks have well-settled meanings in the English
language." 9 A trademark claimant therefore cannot gain protection
on the basis of acquired distinctiveness without changing the meaning
of things already familiar to consumers. In turn, this change cannot
happen without exposing consumers to confusion because consumers
cannot give new meaning to a familiar item until they encounter the
familiar item attached to its new meaning. That new meaning may
eventually become sufficiently established to gain trademark
protection, but consumers must first sort through the confusion of
considering both meanings and deciding how to use both meanings.
For example, the first time consumers encounter "Safari" shoes,
they cannot know whether they are dealing with shoes designed for
116. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
117. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. Marks frequently lack
distinctiveness because they describe characteristics of the goods themselves. Consumers
therefore may think of these terms as basic information about goods for sale rather than
their source. For example, trademarks like "All-Bran," "Band-Aid," or "Scholastic" did
not refer to a specific company on the day they were introduced. See ALL-BRAN,
Registration No. 0314238 (registration of "All Bran" for cereal); BAND-AID,
Registration No. 0194123 (registration of "Band-Aid" for bandages); SCHOLASTIC,
Registration No. 0273405 (registration of "Scholastic" for publications). The source
identification meanings for these marks therefore appeared over time as consumers
learned the new meanings.
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safaris, or shoes made by a particular manufacturer, or even both.
They may eventually learn that "Safari" designates a particular source
for shoes, but not without experiencing and overcoming confusion.
This process shows that trademark law, at least in this area, does not
operate simply by shielding consumers from confusion. Rather,
trademark law invites and encourages producers to expose consumers
to confusion by holding out the promise of trademark protection if a
producer can teach consumers to recognize familiar words or product
features as source identifiers.12 0
2. Private-Label Goods
A focus on facts that exist only after consumers have overcome
confusion also exists in the case law concerning so-called private-label
(also known as "store-brand") goods.12' Retailers typically sell
private-label products in packaging that resembles the packaging for
name-brand goods, and the private-label products are typically sold
immediately alongside name-brand goods. 122 Undoubtedly, many
readers have had the experience of shopping and mistakenly picking
up or even buying a store-brand product instead of the desired namebrand one. I surmise that many readers have further learned from
that mistake and can now distinguish name-brand and store-brand
products quite effectively.
Not surprisingly, name-brand manufacturers object to the
packaging practices of their private-label competitors, and they have
often asserted claims for trademark infringement.123 When these cases
120. Although not central to the point being made here, consumers must overcome
small amounts of confusion even in cases that involve arbitrary or fanciful marks that
courts would consider inherently distinctive. For example, "Just Do It" has an ordinary
English meaning other than as a source identifier for Nike. Nike therefore could not make
effective use of this mark until they had educated consumers to learn the new meaning
Nike had given the phrase. Similarly, Apple Computer had to teach consumers a new
meaning for the sentence "I want an Apple." The same could be said for many other
famous marks like "Fidelity" (investment services), "Horizon" (cars), and "Colt"
(firearms).
121. "Private-label" and "store-brand" are terms used to identify products made or
sold by retailers as substitutes for similar products made by known, name-brand
manufacturers. See Store-Brand Taste-Off, CONSUMER REP. MAG., Oct. 2012, at 16-17.
122. For example, the CVS Pharmacy generally sells its store-brand pain relievers next
to name brands, such as Tylenol, Advil, and Motrin. See CVS/pharmacy Brand Shop, CVS,
http://cvs.com/shop/brand-shop/C/CVSpharmacy/_/N-3qZla78jo (last visited Nov. 25,
2014).
123. For lawsuits brought by brand-name trademark holders, see generally McNeil
Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners, L.L.C., 511 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 2007);
Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Oral-B Labs., Inc.,
v. Mi-Lor Corp., 810 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986), superseded by Paddington Corp. v. Attiki
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were first litigated, courts often decided them in favor of the namebrand plaintiffs. 24 After all, the private-label sellers deliberately
chose similar packaging for directly competing goods, and the errors
made by shoppers represented precisely the sort of confusion
trademark is supposed to eliminate.
Over time, however, courts have come to understand these cases
differently. Instead of finding that private-label packaging confuses
consumers, opinions now generally state that consumers are not
confused because they have learned from prior experience to
distinguish private-label goods from their name-brand referents.125
For example, in Conopco, Inc. v. May DepartmentStores Company,12 6
the Federal Circuit rejected a trademark claim against a private-label
seller of hand lotion by writing as follows:
The retailer packages its product in a manner to make it clear
to the consumer that the product is similar to the national
brand, and is intended for the same purposes. At the same time,
the retailer clearly marks its product with its private logo, and
expressly invites the consumer to compare its product with that
of the national brand, by name. With the rise of regional and
national discount retailers with established names and logos,
retailers who market both national brands and their own
private label brands in direct competition, this form of
competition has become commonplace and well-known in the
marketplace. When such packaging is clearly labelled [sic] and
differentiated ... we are unwilling to attribute to the Eighth
Circuit, absent clear precedent so requiring, a rule that would
make such competition presumptively unlawful.127
Look carefully at the premise of this argument. By rejecting the
plaintiff's claim on the ground that consumers have become familiar
with the practice of private-label packaging, Conopco focuses on facts
that can exist only after consumers have encountered confusion.128
Imps. & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug
Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Majestic Drug Co. v. Olla Beauty Supply, Inc.,
No. 97 Civ. 0046, 1997 WL 37955 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1997); Kroger Co. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 570 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
124. See, e.g., Oral-B Labs., 810 F.2d at 21; McNeil-PPC, 984 F. Supp. at 1074; Majestic
Drug Co., 1997 WL 37955, at *14; Kroger Co., 570 F. Supp. at 1061.
125. See McNeil Nutritionals,511 F.3d at 353-54 (stating that customers were aware of
private-label packaging and affirming denial of preliminary injunction in favor of all but
one defendant); Conopco, 46 F.3d at 1570 (denying claim of trademark infringement).
126. 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 1565 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
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When private-label packaging was introduced, consumers certainly
were confused because they were unfamiliar with the practice and did
not pay attention to distinguishing characteristics that they now spot
easily.129 Accordingly, if consumers are no longer confused, it is
because they experienced and overcame confusion of the very sort
that often supports a finding of trademark infringement.
3. Internet Domain Names
A similar embrace of confusion exists in the case law concerning
Internet domain names. As readers are surely aware, it is quite
common for two websites to share domain names that associate them
with a recognized mark. This similarity could easily confuse
consumers about the true proprietor of the site. For example, the
URL "www.buyorleasealexus.com" could belong to the Toyota
Motor Company or any other party selling Lexus cars. A consumer
who encounters this website surely experiences the kind of confusion
that trademarks have eliminated in other cases.
The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to find infringement on
these very facts. In Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,3 o the

court stated that consumers who use the Internet have become quite
sophisticated about similar domain names and are fully prepared to
discover that domain names do not always accurately identify the
proprietor of a given website."' This statement meant that consumers
encountering "www.buyorleasealexus.com" would avoid premature
conclusions about the website's proprietor until more evidence
became available. Importantly, the court did not consider this delay in
accurate identification to be a form of confusion. Instead, the court
called it "sensible agnosticism."' 32 Other courts have reached similar
results.'
129. See supra note 124 (identifying cases in which courts found consumers confused by
private-label products).
130. 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 1179.
132. Id.
133. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137,
1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that consumers may have once behaved carelessly with
respect to Internet domain names, but they no longer do so); Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum,
Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that internet surfers are
accustomed to discovering that the domain name of a website may not accurately indicate
its owner); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (arguing
that internet users "are 'unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved' when, after 'tak[ing] a stab
at what they think is the most likely domain name for a particular web site' guess wrong
and bring up another's webpage); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d
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Here, as in the case of private labeling, trademark law has again
focused on facts that can exist only after consumers have experienced
and overcome confusion. A consumer who does not know the
proprietor of "www.buyorleasealexus.com" expends effort and
resources to clear his confusion. This seems comparable to the market
disruption caused by "Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts," "Dairy Queen"
and "Dairy Queens," and "Pegasus Petroleum" and Mobil Oil's red
flying horse logo.'" By saying that confusion does not exist because
consumers have become familiar with this lack of clarity, trademark
law focuses on facts that cannot exist without confusing consumers
first.
B.

Trademark Law's Inevitable Introduction of Confusion

Ironically, persistent consumer confusion also comes from the
very process of assigning and enforcing trademark rights. Although
federal law provides for the national registration of marks,' 35 our
trademark system does a relatively poor job of making sure that only
one producer claims ownership of a given mark. Indeed, our
trademark law contemplates that, in some cases, multiple producers
can use the same mark on competing products, and this permitted use
practically guarantees the eventual confusion of consumers.' Even in
cases where ownership of a mark is clear, the very process of
enforcing trademark rights confuses consumers. This confusion
happens because findings of trademark infringement generally result
in injunctions that force losing defendants to rebrand their
products.' This rebranding confuses consumers familiar with the
defendant's now-prohibited brand by making it impossible for those
consumers to use the previously familiar, but now outlawed, mark to
find their preferred goods.
1. Confusion Introduced by the Initial Assignment of Trademark
Rights
According to trademark convention, consumers ideally should
never have to consider two competitors who use the same mark on
117, 125 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[Clonsumers will realize they are at the wrong site and go to an
Internet search engine to find the right one.").
134. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing the small amount of
confusion associated with these cases).
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-54 (2012) (providing for registration of marks under federal
law).
136. See infra Part I1.B.1.
137. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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competing products, for doing so implies confusion over the true
maker of competing goods. Of course, trademark law cannot
completely prevent rivals from independently using identical or
similar marks. Nevertheless, the rules used to assign ownership of
marks can make it easier for rivals to avoid claiming rights to similar
marks.
For example, the law could assign ownership of a mark to the
first claimant who registers the mark. Such a rule would be clear and
relatively easy to enforce. More importantly, registration as a
condition of ownership ensures that those adopting a new mark are
practically certain to know if someone else already owns the mark.
Such knowledge would make it highly unlikely that more than one
party would use and claim ownership of a given mark.
Interestingly, U.S. law does not assign trademark rights on this
basis. Instead, our trademark system grants rights to those who first
make bona fide use of a trademark in commerce."' This rule means
that a producer adopting a new mark does not have to make a formal
claim with the government to gain rights in the mark.'39 It can simply
affix the mark to goods that are sold to the public.14 The producer
may apply to register the mark with the federal government, but the
application will fail unless the producer has used the mark."' Even if
successful, registration does not guarantee complete rights to the
mark, for anyone who has used the mark before registration becomes
effective may continue to make limited use of the mark.'42
138. See Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1893) ("[T]he exclusive
right to the use of the mark or device claimed as a trade-mark is founded on priority of
appropriation; that is to say, the claimant of the trade-mark must have been the first to use
or employ the same on like articles of production."); Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that priority of use establishes right
to a trademark); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975)
("The exclusive right to a trademark belongs to one who first uses it in connection with
specified goods.").
139. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (extending
protection to unregistered trademarks); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke,
Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2006) (granting protection to the plaintiff's unregistered
mark); Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
that unregistered marks are eligible for protection).
140. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768; Louis Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.2d at 115-16; Star
Indus., 412 F.3d at 381.
141. See Aycock Eng'g, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The
registration of a mark that does not meet the use requirement is void ab initio.");
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 19:10 ("The mark must have been 'used in commerce'
before the registration will issue [on the principal register].").
142. See Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 435 (7th Cir.
1999) ("[A] trademark application is always subject to previously established common law
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Assigning trademark rights this way leads to consumer
confusion. By making ownership dependent on use, our trademark
system practically guarantees that rivals will sometimes try to claim
ownership in the same mark. Those rivals will try to perfect their
claims to the mark by using the marks in commerce. This frequently
leads to competing marketing campaigns designed to make
consumers aware of the new mark followed by the formal use of the
mark on goods sold to the public. Of course, these rival campaigns
and product launches mean that consumers will encounter and be
confused by two producers using the same mark on competing goods.
In theory, this confusion might be short lived if trademark law
quickly settled competing claims to the same mark and gave one party
all rights to use the mark. This quick settlement does not happen,
though, because our trademark system limits the initial award of
trademark rights to the geographical areas where a trademark
claimant has actually used the mark.
The cases of United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.' and
Dawn Donut Co. 'v. Hart's Food Stores" illustrate this point. In

United Drug, the petitioner's predecessor in interest began using the
mark "Rex" in Massachusetts for the sale of medicine.'45 That use
began in 1877 and continued for some time as the plaintiff introduced
its products in a wider geographic area.'4 6 In 1883, the respondent
began using "Rex" on medicine in and around Louisville,
Kentucky.'47 At that time, the plaintiff had not begun the sale of Rex
medicines in Kentucky, and indeed, the defendant did not know
about the plaintiff's use of "Rex" in remote areas.'" In 1912, the
plaintiff began selling Rex medicine in the Louisville area.'49 When
the conflicting uses of the mark became apparent, litigation
followed.'s The district court ruled that the petitioner's prior
trademark rights of another party."); Daniel Group v. Service Performance Grp., Inc., 753
F. Supp. 2d 541, 546 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (citing and quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 10, with
approval); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 16:18.50 ("Neither application for nor
registration of a mark at the federal level wipes out the prior nonregistered, common law
rights of others. The nonregistered rights of a senior user continue and are not erased by
the later federal registration of a junior user.").
143. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
144. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
145. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 94.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 94.
148. Id. at 94-95.
149. Id. at 95.
150. See id at 93-96.
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adoption of the mark gave the petitioner exclusive rights to the
mark."' The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court
agreed. 52
In so ruling, the Court clearly established the principle that
trademark rights arise from an established business use of the mark.', 3
Accordingly, use alone does not establish national rights to a
trademark.'5 4 Instead, the right extends only so far as the geographic
reach of the trademark claimant's actual use.'"' This limitation means
that a trademark claimant has no rights against good faith junior users
of the same mark who conduct business in areas geographically
remote from the claimant's use. Indeed, the Court held that such a
junior user would actually have rights superior to the senior user in
the areas where the junior user moved first.'56 This holding meant that
the United Drug petitioner, despite adopting "Rex" as its mark before
the respondent, actually had no right to use "Rex" in the Louisville,
Kentucky area.'
The principle laid down in United Drug practically guarantees
that consumer confusion will eventually arise. Inevitably, two
potential rivals will occasionally use the same or similar marks on
competing goods in separate markets. If they do so in good faith, they
both establish rights in the mark and will begin expanding their
businesses. And, when the two businesses finally meet in a shared
market, consumer confusion is certain because the two rivals will sell
competing products under the same mark. Of course, this problem
could be ameliorated if registration of a mark conferred national
rights on the first person to register the mark. However, geographic
limits on trademark rights exist even when a trademark owner
successfully registers.

151. Id. at 96.
152. Id. at 96,104.
153. Id. at 97 ("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.").
154. Id. at 98 ("[Tlhe adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the absence of
some valid legislation enacted for the purpose, project the right of protection in advance
of the extension of the trade, or operate as a claim of territorial rights over areas into
which it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the trade.").
155. Id. ("[Tlhe expression ... that a trade-mark right is not limited in its enjoyment by
territorial bounds, is true only in the sense that wherever the trade goes, attended by the
use of the mark, the right of the trader to be protected against the sale by others of their
wares in the place of his wares will be sustained.").
156. Id. at 100-02.
157. Id. at 103-04.
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For example, in Dawn Donut, the plaintiff, Dawn Donut, used
the marks "Dawn" and "Dawn Donut'' to sell doughnut mix and
retail doughnuts in a number of states, including Michigan and New
York.' Dawn first used the marks in 1922 and registered them in
1927.159 Starting in 1951, the defendant, Hart's Food, used the
"Dawn" mark to sell retail doughnuts in the area of Rochester, New
York." Dawn Donut objected and filed suit.'6'
Dawn Donut's claim was quite simple. Federal registration
meant that the defendant had constructive notice of Dawn Donut's
prior use of the mark, and Dawn Donut could therefore prevent
Hart's from making use of the mark.162 The Second Circuit disagreed.
In ruling for Hart's, the Second Circuit noted that Dawn Donut had
not used the "Dawn" mark to sell retail doughnuts around Rochester
for decades.'
Accordingly, Hart's use of the mark was highly
unlikely to cause consumers confusion because Rochester area
customers would not be familiar with Dawn Donuts sold at retail."
Accordingly, Dawn Donuts could not stop Hart's from using the mark
unless Dawn Donuts actually began using the "Dawn" mark on retail
doughnuts in the Rochester area.'6 1
Note again that trademark's rules for assigning and enforcing
ownership of marks practically guarantee confusion. Sooner or later,
a mark owner like Dawn Donuts will move into an area analogous to
Rochester where a business like Hart's will have already been using
the mark. The senior user may enjoy the satisfaction of making the
junior user of the mark stop, but confusion will already be inevitable
because consumers who see the senior user's goods sold under the
mark will naturally wonder if the goods were actually made by the
junior user. This confusion cannot be easily reduced or avoided
without changing existing law about the initial assignment and
enforcement of trademark rights.
2. Confusion Introduced by Trademark Judgments
The process of assigning and enforcing trademark rights creates
confusion even when rules of geographic priority have no effect. In
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

267 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1959).
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 365.
Id.
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almost every trademark case worth litigating, the plaintiff makes a
plausible claim that consumers will be confused, and the defendant
makes a credible claim to the contrary. Frequently, both litigants are
right because consumers vary in their responses to trademarks. Some
consumers will mistakenly believe that the plaintiff's and defendant's
marks indicate the same source, while others will correctly distinguish
between the marks. These contrasting responses set the stage for
confusion.
If a court decides a case like this for the defendant, it obviously
permits some degree of consumer confusion to continue. While the
court may believe that, on the whole, most consumers are not
confused, this does nothing to help the minority of consumers who
are confused. The court's decision for the defendant means that those
consumers will continue to face confusion until they figure things out
for themselves.
The persistence of confusion after a decision against
infringement may help explain .why judges seem willing to find
infringement even when the likelihood of confusion seems small.
Finding infringement seems to eliminate confusion at little cost. The
minority of consumers who face confusion will no longer do so. And,
presumably, the majority of consumers who were not confused will
still be able to distinguish between the two marks.
Unfortunately, this thinking overlooks the likelihood that
eliminating confusion for those unable to distinguish between the two
marks will introduce new and different confusion for those who were
not initially confused. Remember, the usual consequence of *a
decision in favor of the plaintiff is an injunction forbidding the
defendant from using its mark.166 This injunction forces the defendant
to rebrand its goods, impairing the ability of previously unconfused
consumers to find their preferred products. As an initial matter, their
preferred product disappears because it is pulled off the market as an
infringing product. Then, when it is reintroduced to the market under
a new name, consumers will be confused because they will not
initially know that the product sold under the new name is actually
their preferred brand made by their preferred manufacturer. In short,
trademark law will, under the guise of reducing confusion, do the very

166. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 30:1 ("An injunction is the usual and standard
remedy once trademark infringement has been found.").
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thing it is supposed to prevent-namely, make it harder for some
consumers to identify and purchase their preferred goods.'67
To see a concrete example of how this might happen, consider E.
& J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero,'" a case involving the

well-known American wine producer, Gallo, and Consorzio del Gallo
Nero, an Italian trade association promoting Italian Chianti Classico
wines.' 9 Consorzio chose its name "Consorzio del Gallo Nero"
because its members had used the symbol of a black rooster ("gallo
nero" in Italian) on their wines.o When Consorzio decided to mount
a campaign to promote the sale of Chianti Classico wines in the
United States, it used the words "Gallo Nero" in advertisements for
its wine."' Gallo objected and sent Consorzio a cease and desist
letter, but Consorzio eventually went ahead with its campaign.' 72
Gallo then sued for trademark infringement."'
It is easy to imagine how this case could have come out in favor
of either party. On the one hand, some consumers might have
confused "Gallo" and "Gallo Nero," perhaps believing that Gallo had
begun marketing a special line of Gallo Nero wines. On the other
hand, other consumers probably suffered no confusion at all. These
consumers included those who already knew the precise identity of
Consorzio del Gallo Nero as the trade association for Chianti Classico
wines. Some of these consumers surely liked Consorzio del Gallo
Nero wines (perhaps because they had experienced the wines in
Italy), deliberately searched for them, and bought them.
The Gallo court.found that a likelihood of confusion existed and
enjoined Consorzio del Gallo Nero from using "Gallo" when
marketing its wines in the United States.'74 When Consorzio del Gallo
Nero chose a new name under which to market its wines, consumers
not confused by its use of "Gallo" probably experienced confusion
167. The size and significance of this disruption is confirmed by the considerable
literature that describes the problems associated with rebranding. This literature reflects
the realization that consumers will not easily overcome the confusion associated with
rebranding. See Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 17-31 (2010) (arguing that the structural features of trademark law are
poorly positioned to serve as an effective restraint on the consumer confusion that
rebranding can create).
168. 782 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
169. Id. at 460.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 471.
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when they encountered the new name. Even if that name bore
reasonable resemblance to "Consorzio del Gallo Nero," it is likely
that consumers had to consider the possibility that a rival seller of
Chianti Classico wines had entered the market. The time consumers
spent learning the correct meaning of the new name therefore
represents confusion caused by trademark law."'
3. Confusion Introduced by the Abandonment of Trademark Rights
A trademark holder does not necessarily own rights in a mark
forever. Among other things, a trademark holder risks forfeiting
ownership of its marks if it stops using them. Under federal law, a
trademark holder abandons its mark by discontinuing use with no
intent to resume.'7 6 Three consecutive years of nonuse provides prima
facie evidence of the intent to abandon.'"
At first blush, one might conclude that abandonment through
nonuse carries little risk of consumer confusion. A mark that
disappears from use for three years surely loses a great deal of its
value as a source identifier. If a new producer then comes forward to
use an abandoned mark and establish new rights, one might think that
consumers will adopt the new meaning for the mark fairly easily.
Closer reflection suggests that consumer confusion is not so
easily avoided. In many cases, trademarks retain considerable source
identification power long after they are no longer in use. For example,
the mark "Pan-Am" evokes strong memories of the defunct airline."'
If this mark is considered abandoned, new users of "Pan-Am" will
surely confuse consumers, who will wonder if the old airline has
somehow come back into business. This suggests that marks retaining
power as source identifiers should not be considered abandoned, even

175. See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60, 78-87 (2008) (arguing that trademark law inadequately recognizes and protects
the interests of non-confused consumers, leading to the expansion of trademark rights).

176. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).

177. Id.
178. The Pan-Am mark has been re-used a number of times by unaffiliated airlines
capitalizing on consumer familiarity with and affection for the original airline. See Bill
Chappell, Pan-Am Airline Set To Return to the Air Next Month, NPR (Oct. 20, 2010, 8:18
PM), http://npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/10/29/1 3 09 2 6486/pan-am-airline-will-return-tothe-air-next-month (mentioning five attempted revivals of the Pan-Am brand); Bruce
Drum, Pan American Airways To Revive the Pan Am Brand with Boeing 737-800s,
WORLD AIRLINE NEWS (Apr. 17, 2014), http://worldairlinenews.com/2014/04/17/panamerican-airways-to-revive-the-pan-am-brand-with-boeing-737-800s/ (showing a recent
attempt to revive the Pan-Am brand).
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if use has been stopped with no intent to resume. For better or worse,
courts have not interpreted the law in this way.
In Silverman v. CBS Inc.,179 the Second Circuit found that the
plaintiff, CBS, could not stop the defendant, Silverman, from
developing a musical based on the Amos 'N' Andy radio and
television shows created by CBS." Among other things, the court
ruled that CBS had abandoned the Amos 'N' Andy Show trademark
because the network had not commercially exploited the mark in
twenty years. 8"' CBS's case had considerable equitable appeal. The
network stopped broadcasting the show primarily because the show
caused racial controversy.182 Accordingly, CBS could plausibly argue
that it had no intent to abandon the work and that it hoped to revive
the show someday.' This argument fell on deaf ears. The court held
that because CBS had no reasonably foreseeable plans to use its
mark, the necessary intent to abandon existed." CBS therefore no
longer had rights to the mark.185
Whatever one thinks about whether CBS had the statutorily
defined intent to cause abandonment, it is quite likely that the public
had not forgotten about the Amos 'N' Andy show and its affiliation
with CBS. The show originated on radio as one of the country's most
popular programs, 186 and the television series was shown from 1951 to
1966.187 Accordingly, when Silverman brought his show to the public,
consumers surely would wonder if CBS had revived the Amos 'N'
Andy show or was otherwise involved in the musical. Such confusion
is. precisely the kind of confusion that trademark law considers
actionable in other cases, but this confusion obviously did not stop the
court from ruling against CBS. Accordingly, it is quite clear that, in at.
least some cases, judicial findings of abandonment introduce
consumer confusion.'88
179. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).
180. Id. at 43 (holding that the plaintiffs trademarks were invalid).
181. Id. at 47.
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 47.
185. Id. at 47-48.
186. Id. at 42.
187. Id.
188. Other abandonment cases that create confusion include Rust Environment &
Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1219-20. (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
former employees of the plaintiff consulting firm formerly called "Donahue & Associates"
were entitled to call the new consulting firm "Donahue & Associates" because the
plaintiff had abandoned the mark); Intrawest Fin. Corp. v. W. Nat'l Bank of Denver, 610 F.
Supp. 950, 961 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff bank, having changed its name
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DeliberatelyAccepting Consumer Confusion

A final source of persistent consumer confusion comes from
accepting such confusion in order to prevent undue harm to free
competition. Such a phenomenon should come as no surprise. After
all, the purpose of trademark law is the prevention of confusion that
damages the operation of markets.'89 It therefore makes sense for
trademark law to avoid imposing liability if doing so would
undermine the very competition that makes markets work in the first
place. Nevertheless, trademark plaintiffs have argued that preventing
consumer confusion is more important than other competition-related
concerns, and courts have often rejected these arguments by refusing
to follow the eradicate confusion norm as vigorously as they could.'
The doctrines of fair use and functionality offer good examples of
how trademark law violates the eradicate confusion norm by
accepting consumer confusion. 9 '
1. Fair Use
A previously known word may acquire sufficient distinctiveness
to become a trademark, but this does not mean that old meanings
associated with the word completely disappear. It is therefore
possible that a potential defendant will use a mark merely to describe
the defendant's goods in a non-source-identifying way and that the
trademark holder will nevertheless consider such a use confusing. For
example, a candy manufacturer could gain a trademark in the word
"Sweetart" for candies, and a juice manufacturer might use the word
"sweet-tart" to describe its juice.'" Such behavior arguably creates a
likelihood of confusion over whether the same manufacturer makes
the candies and juice. However, trademark law generally excuses
from "First National Bank of Denver" to "IntraWest Bank of Denver," could not prevent
the defendant from using the name "First National Bank of Denver"). Courts occasionally
prevent a subsequent user of an abandoned mark from using the mark in order to prevent
public confusion. See Indianapolis Colts v. Metro. Bait. Football Club Ltd. P'ship, 34 F.3d
410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a National Football League team, the "Indianapolis
Colts," had the right to prevent a Canadian Football League team from using the
abandoned name "Baltimore Colts" because the public would be confused). However,
subsequent decisions limit the reach of such holdings, leaving abandoned marks generally
free for adoption. See Rust Env't & Infrastructure,131 F.3d at 1215 (finding in favor of the
defendant and characterizing the facts of IndianapolisColts as "unique").
189. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
192. See Sunmark, Inc., v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1060-61 (7th
Cir. 1995).
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defendants in cases like this under the affirmative defense of fair use
if the mark has been used in good faith and solely in a manner
"descriptive of the actor's goods."1 3
The fair use defense raises an important question about the
priorities of trademark law. If the defense did not exist, defendants
could not make good faith, descriptive uses of marks, and this
restriction would impair the ability of defendants to inform
consumers about the basic qualities of their products. At the same
time, however, the fair use defense could prevent trademark holders
from eliminating consumer confusion. This issue raises the question
of whether a defendant first should have to establish that its behavior
creates no likelihood of consumer confusion before claiming fair use.
If trademark law values the elimination of confusion more than the
accurate description of products, the answer to this question would
presumably be "yes." Conversely, if accurate description is more
important than eliminating confusion, the answer would be "no."
The Supreme Court considered this very question in KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.'94 KP

Permanent Make-Up involved a dispute between two make-up
manufacturers who both used a version of the term "micro color" in
marketing their products.' The defendant, Lasting, registered the
term as a mark in 1992, and the plaintiff, KP, produced a brochure
using "micro color" in prominent type in 1999.196 KP justified its use
of "micro color" under the fair use defense.19 Lasting countered KP's
fair use claim by arguing that fair use could not exist unless the
defendant had proved the absence of a likelihood of confusion.'98
Such an argument would, if accepted, shield consumers from the
confusion of seeing the term "micro color" used in different ways.
The Supreme Court rejected Lasting's contention, holding
instead that some undefined level of confusion was entirely
compatible with a finding of fair use.'" The Court recognized that
consumer confusion could affect whether a given use was fair, but the
mere existence of confusion could not automatically negate the
defense because of the interests served by the accurate descriptions of
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (constituting the codification of fair use
defense); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 (1995).
194. 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
195. Id. at 114.
196. Id. at 115.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 118-20.
199. Id. at 119-20.
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goods. 21 The Court supported this reasoning by noting that "the
common law of unfair competition also tolerated some degree of
confusion from a descriptive use of words contained in another
person's trademark." 20' This led to the conclusion "that some
possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair

use."202
2. Functionality
Like fair use, the doctrine of functionality also permits some
degree of consumer confusion in order to preserve free competition.
Functionality assumes importance when a plaintiff makes a
trademark claim over a product feature that not only has acquired
distinctiveness but also serves an important physical purpose in the
value of the product itself. 203 If trademark law protected such product
features, it would prevent consumer confusion by preserving an
exclusive association between the product feature and the trademark
claimant. However, this would also prevent competitors from making
competing products with the same desired features, thus hindering
free-market competition.
For example, in Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,

Inc.,20 the plaintiff, Marketing Displays, made temporary road signs
with an unusual dual-spring design that kept the signs from blowing
down in strong gusts of wind.205 Because Marketing Displays held
patents over this technology, it was the only producer of these signs
and consumers arguably came to rely on these springs as source
identifiers associated with Marketing Displays.2" When Marketing
Displays' patents expired, the defendant, Traffix, began making and
selling signs using the same dual-spring technology. 207 Marketing
Displays then sued for trade-dress infringement.208
200. Id.atlll,118-23.
201. Id. at 119.
202. Id. at 121. Note that the Court did not specify how much confusion would be
tolerated. The notion that there is some upper limit on how much confusion would be
excused by fair use makes sense from a teaching perspective, as there are limits on what
people can learn.
203. See, e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494,
503-05 (6th Cir. 2013); Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 677, 683-84
(9th Cir. 2012); Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH v. Ritter GmbH, 289 F.3d 351, 354-55
(5th Cir. 2002).
204. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
205. Id. at 25.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 26.
208. Id.
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The Supreme Court found in favor of Traffix.w In so ruling, the
Court expressed concern that allowing protection for functional
features, like the dual-spring, would harm free competition.2 10
Preventing competitors like Traffix from using the dual-spring feature
would be tantamount to giving patent protection to Marketing
Displays despite the springs being part of the public domain.211 The
Court refused to accept this result, stating that concerns about
competition were, at least in this case, more important than
preventing consumer confusion.2 12 Trademark protection would
therefore be denied even if the dual-spring technology had acquired
distinctiveness.213 This meant accepting the confusion of any
consumers who used the dual-spring feature as a source identifier.2 41
The pervasive and persistent confusion described in this Part
challenges conventional wisdom about consumer confusion. As noted
earlier, trademark convention advocates eliminating modest
confusion precisely because such confusion supposedly impairs the
This impairment implies that
proper operation of markets.'
widespread failure to eliminate such confusion would leave our
markets seriously damaged. Indeed, the aggressive expansion of
trademark rights and the eradicate confusion norm can be seen as the
implementation of this very line of thinking.
What then are we to make of the many instances of confusion
that trademark law accepts or even encourages? If trademark law's
conventional wisdom about confusion is correct, then our trademark
system ought to have some pretty significant problems because-as
Part II has described-consumers face minor confusion all the time
and trademark law accepts it. If modest confusion really does damage
markets, then we should see consumer preferences regularly
209. Id. at 35.
210. Id. at 29 (expressing concern that there is generally no prohibition against the
copying of products because it is important to preserve competition).
211. Id. at 30-31 (holding that the claims at the heart of the plaintiff's trademark claim
were covered by the expired patents).
212. Id. at 32-33 (noting the importance of preserving competition in cases where the
plaintiff seeks trademark protection for functional product features).
213. Id. at 35 ("[Plaintiff] cannot gain the exclusive right to produce sign stands using
the dual-spring design by asserting that consumers associate it with the look of the
invention itself.").
214. Id. at 33 ("In the instant case, beyond serving the purpose of informing consumers
that the sign stands are made by [Marketing Displays] (assuming it does so), the dualspring design provides a unique and useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind.
Functionality having been established, whether [Marketing Display's] dual-spring design
has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered.").
215. See supra Part I.
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frustrated by the confusion that trademark law fails to eliminate. Of
course, this does not happen. On the whole, consumers find the goods
they want, which suggests that trademark convention is wrong about
the harms associated with modest consumer confusion. Indeed, as
Part III shall argue, it is far more likely that modest consumer
confusion actually plays a constructive role for our trademark system
and, by extension, our markets.
III. THE BENEFITS OF PERSISTENT CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK

The constructive value of confusion emerges from realizing that
trademark law can reduce consumer confusion only if consumers have
some basic ability to identify and distinguish between trademarks. At
first blush, one might think that consumers are born with a full
understanding of trademarks and naturally know how to navigate a
modern commercial marketplace. In fact, however, even the most
basic consumer abilities develop over time from exposure to
trademarks encountered in daily life.2 16
This process begins during childhood. 2 17 As consumer researchers
explain, a child progresses through many stages of consumer
socialization that reflect a growing awareness of and ability to deal
with the complex messages found in commercial marketplaces.218
Although the relevant research does not focus specifically on
trademarks, it does say a great deal about the development of
consumer knowledge, decision making, and brand awareness. 219 It
therefore seems appropriate to apply knowledge about general
216. See J. Wesley Hutchinson & Eric M. Eisenstein, Consumer Learning and
Expertise, in HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 103, 103-04 (Curtis P. Haugtvedt
et al. eds., 2008).
217. See, e.g., JAMES U. MCNEAL, ON BECOMING A CONSUMER: DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR PATTERNS IN CHILDHOOD 27-31 (2007) (describing the multistage process of consumer development beginning shortly after birth); Deborah Roedder
John, Consumer Socialization of Children:A Retrospective Look at Twenty-Five Years of
Research, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 183, 186-87 (1999); Patti M. Valkenburg & Joanne
Cantor, The Development of a Child into a Consumer, 22 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 61, 63-69 (2001) (presenting the four-stage process of consumer development
in children).
218. See, e.g., MCNEAL, supra note 217, at 27-31 (describing the multi-stage process of
consumer development beginning shortly after birth); John, supra note 217, at 186-87;
Valkenburg & Cantor, supra note 217, at 63-69 (presenting the four-stage process of
consumer development in children).
219. See, e.g., Deborah Roedder John, Stages of Consumer Socialization: The
Development of Consumer Knowledge, Skills, and Values From Childhood to Adolescence,
in HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 221, 237 (Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al. eds.,
2008) (describing levels of consumer knowledge, decision making, and brand awareness at
each stage of consumer socialization).
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consumer development and learning to our understanding of
trademark law.
Professor Deborah Roedder John presents the development of
the child consumer in three stages: the perceptual stage (ages three to
seven), the analytical stage (ages seven to eleven), and the reflective
stage (age eleven to adult).220 In the perceptual stage, children begin
their development as consumers with a relatively simple egocentric
outlook that does not recognize how others perceive products or the
consumer process.22 ' Consumers in the perceptual stage focus on what
they can readily perceive and develop familiarity with brands, but
they rarely exhibit complex decision making skills or strategies.222
These consumers often make choices on the basis of limited
information that is easy to perceive and comprehend, such as size.223
Nevertheless, these children begin to develop brand preferences and
an understanding of the consumer search process.224
Things change rapidly as young consumers progress through the
analytical stage, in which children learn to consider multiple
perspectives about products and choices. 225 These young consumers
can name multiple brands, develop abstract and detailed knowledge
of products, and learn more sophisticated search strategies that focus
attention on relevant information. 226 These children even begin to
understand the subtle meanings society attaches to possessions, a skill
crucial to the effective comprehension of modern trademarks. 2 7
By the time a young consumer reaches the reflective stage, he
has begun to acquire adult consumer habits and skills.228 Brand
knowledge becomes more detailed and sophisticated as the awareness
and recall of brand names rises. 229 The consumer pays even more
attention to the social aspects of consumption and understands the
status and prestige associated with certain brands.2 " Search
sophistication increases as well. 231 Consumers in the reflective stage

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227-28.
See id. at 229.
Id. at 230-32.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 234-35.
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adapt search strategies to different situations.232 They respond to
complex situations by focusing more effectively on the relevant
information, and they seek out additional information from trusted

sources. 233
Of course, consumer development does not end with
adulthood. 23 Rather, the skills developed in childhood allow adult
consumers to continue adapting to the trademarks they encounter.235
Research on adult-consumer learning confirms the common intuition
that continued exposure to products increases consumer familiarity
with those products. 236 That familiarity leads to expertise, as
consumers learn from their accumulated product experiences.23 7
Finally, and most importantly, increased expertise makes people
better at finding the products they want quickly and accurately.238 In
short, consumers learn to navigate the markets they encounter, and
they get better and better at doing so over time.
The process by which this improvement occurs involves the
combination of unconscious and conscious thought. As Professor
Daniel Kahneman explains, the human mind operates simultaneously
in two different modes. 239 The first, which he labels System 1,
"operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no
sense of voluntary control." 240 The second, which he calls System 2,
"allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it,
232. Id. at 225, 235.
233. Id. at 234. For example, young children do not understand that advertisements are
intended to sell products, and they treat advertisements as unbiased, reliable sources of
information. Id. at 226. By the time children reach the reflective stage, they are
sophisticated about advertisements and can ignore them in favor of other information that
is more reliable, such as actual product characteristics. Id. at 233, 237-38.
234. See generally Hutchinson & Eisenstein, supra note 216 (discussing consumer
learning from childhood to adulthood).
235. See John, supra note 219, at 221. See generally Hutchinson & Eisenstein, supra
note 216 (discussing consumer learning from childhood to adulthood).
236. See Joseph W. Alba & J. Wesley Hutchinson, Dimensions of Consumer Expertise,
13 J. CONSUMER RES. 411, 411 (1987).

237. Id. ("In general, increased product familiarity results in increased consumer
expertise.").
238. See Elizabeth Cowley & Andrew A. Mitchell, The Moderating Effect of Product
Knowledge on the Learning and Organization of Product Information, 30 J. CONSUMER
RES. 443, 451 (2003) (arguing that high-knowledge consumers are more effective at
retrieving appropriate and helpful brand information); Hutchinson & Eisenstein, supra
note 216, at 103-04 (stating that expertise makes people "better and more efficient" as
consumers); Eric J. Johnson & J. Edward Russo, Product Familiarityand Learning New
Information, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 542, 549 (1984) (stating that experienced consumers
are better able to make decisions predictive of product performance).
239. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOw 20-21 (2011).
240. Id. at 20.
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including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are
often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and
concentration." 241' Both of these systems operate when a person is
awake.242 System 1 handles most functions.243 It governs the tasks that
are familiar, routine, and automatic. 2 " These include understanding
simple sentences, walking, and recognizing facial expressions.245 By
contrast, System 2 handles complex, novel, and challenging tasks that
require significant thought and concentration.' These tasks include
logical argument, math problems, and searching memory when
confronted with a surprising situation.247
System 1 and System 2 matter to the study of trademark law
because consumers use both to understand marks. A consumer
walking through a grocery store has a number of ingrained shopping
preferences that System 1 executes. If she eats Kellogg's Frosted
Flakes every day, System 1 probably scans the shelf quickly for
something like Tony the Tiger, and she puts the cereal in her
shopping cart without further reflection.
Importantly, however, System 1 is doing more than searching for
Tony the Tiger in supermarkets. System 1 is also busy collecting
impressions of everything the consumer encounters. Using System 1 is
not a process of conscious memorization. Rather, System 1
unconsciously notices things, associates them with other things, and
files the associations away for future use.248 These associations include
spontaneous evaluations of product qualities ("Frosted Flakes taste
sweet"), impressions collected from casual encounters with
advertisements ("Apple computers are cool"), and information

241. Id. at 21.
242. Id. at 24.
243. See Henk Arts & Ap Dijksterhuis, Habits As Knowledge Structures: Automaticity
in Goal-DirectedBehavior, 78 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2000) ("The
majority of people's actions are executed on a routine basis."); John A. Bargh & Tanya L.
Chartrand, The UnbearableAutomaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 462 (1999)
(advancing the thesis that "most of a person's everyday life is determined ... by mental
processes that are put into motion by features of the environment and that operate outside
of conscious awareness and guidance.").
244. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 239, at 21.
245. See id. at 19, 21.
246. See id. at 22.
247. See id. at 20-22.
248. See id. at 50-52; Stijn M. J. van Osselaer & Chris Janiszewski, Two Ways of
Learning Brand Associations, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 202, 205-06 (2001) (describing
"Human Associative Memory" as a process that consumers generally use to store
information when they are not heavily focused on making predictions).
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gleaned from daily life ("Harvard is a prestigious university"). 249 It is
entirely possible, and even likely, that this hypothetical consumer
learned in this very manner to buy Frosted Flakes by searching for
Tony the Tiger. She liked the cereal, noticed the packaging, and
formed an association confirmed over time by the experience of many
satisfactory purchases. 25 0 Because the human mind tends to be lazy, 251
it will allow System 1 to continue accumulating and acting on
unexamined information in this very manner as long as the results are
satisfactory. As long as the consumer gets her Frosted Flakes and
other desired products, she will shop with whatever strategies System
1 has produced, including System 1's approach to trademarks.25 2
Things work differently, however, when consumers encounter
surprises and challenges. Because System 1 deals with the familiar
and routine, surprises and challenges give System 1 trouble.253 When
this happens, System 2 gets involved .and formulates a strategy for
dealing with the problem at hand. 254 For example, our hypothetical
consumer might be jolted from her System 1 shopping habits by
encountering new packaging for Kellogg's Frosted Flakes. If she came
across a box without Tony the Tiger on it, she might be unsure about
what was inside. System 2 would then examine the new package
carefully, looking for clues about the meaning of the new packaging.
If System 2 concluded that the box did contain Kellogg's Frosted
Flakes, she would buy the product, and, if System 2's prediction
249. See Jonah Berger & GrAinne Fitzsimons, Dogs on the Street, Pumas on Your Feet:
How Cues in the Environment Affect Product Evaluation and Choice, 45 J. MARKETING
RES. 1, 1, 11-12 (2008) (demonstrating that incidental exposure to everyday items creates
associations that affect consumers' evaluation and choice of products); van Osselaer et al.,
supra note 248, at 205 (referring to the basic Hebbian principle that "what fires together,
wires together" to make the point that consumers often learn simply by unconsciously
remembering stimuli that occurred together).
250. See Wayne D. Hoyer, An Examination of Consumer Decision Making for a
Common Repeat PurchaseProduct,11 J. CONSUMER RES. 822, 823-24 (1984) (stating that
consumers use simple decision heuristics for routine purchases in order to reduce their
cognitive effort).
251. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 239, at 164 (referring to the laziness of System 2);
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Knowledge Accessibility and Behavior Implications for
Consumer Information Processing, in HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 31, 34
(Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al. eds., 2008) ("People rarely retrieve and use more knowledge
than is necessary to attain the objective they are pursuing.").
252. See Hoyer, supra note 250, at 824; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 239, at 24-25
(stating that System 2 is uninvolved in decision-making as long as results gained by relying
on System 1 remain satisfactory).
253. KAHNEMAN, supra note 239, at 21,24.
254. See id. at 24-25 (arguing that System 2 is activated in conditions of surprise or
other events inconsistent with expectations of System 1).
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proved correct, she would begin associating the new packaging with
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes. Remembering this new association and
acting upon it might take effort at first. However, as she repeated her
new System 2 strategy, it would become progressively easier to
execute. Eventually, System 1 would learn from System 2 and adopt
the previously costly and difficult System 2 association. The new
packaging would become as familiar and easy to use as the old
packaging graced by Tony the Tiger.255
Over time, unconscious and conscious adaptations of the sort
described above result in consumers whose behaviors and skills
reflect the trademark environments in which they live. This
adaptation makes perfect sense. Consumers must learn to navigate
marketplaces to live successfully in modern society. Indeed,
consumers have the incentive to improve their skills because nuanced
and sophisticated understandings of marketplace signals like
trademarks help consumers identify the goods they want more
quickly and more accurately. Consumer researchers describe several
ways in which this happens.
First, market experience speeds up consumer decision making
because a person can recall a memorized fact more quickly than he
can derive it. A person responds almost instantly to "What is 2 + 2?"
because he used System 2 to learn and commit the answer to his
memory long ago, and System 1 can now quickly retrieve it. By
contrast, giving the answer to "What is 17 x 24?" takes much longer
because he has not memorized the answer and System 2 must figure it
out. 256 When it comes to the functioning of our trademark system,
things work well in part because consumers remember various marks
through repeated exposure. This allows consumers to quickly identify
and distinguish marks from one another, even when considerable
similarities exist.257
Second, market experience helps consumers remember and
make sense of new situations they encounter. A chess master
255. See Alba & Hutchinson, supra note 236, at 412-14 (arguing that repetition enables
consumers to perform tasks more quickly, more effectively, and with less mental effort);
KAHNEMAN, supra note 239, at 35 (arguing that development of skill in a particular task
allows a person to execute that task with less effort); James Shanteau, Competence in
Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics, 53 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 252, 254-55 (1992) ("Expertise is gained in stages. In the last stage,
the skills of an expert 'become practiced and rapid.' ").
256. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 239, at 20-22,24.
257. For example, through repeated exposure, one can become extremely adept at
distinguishing between identical marks used on different products such as United (airline
and moving services), Delta (airline and faucets), and Dell (computers and books).
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remembers chess positions better than a chess novice because the
many positions seen and studied by the master give her a larger set of
experiences from which to draw.258 Prior. exposure to and analysis of
multiple games give the master ways to connect new situations (i.e.,
new chess positions) to knowledge she already has. She understands
deeper structures that make it easier for her to remember and analyze
new situations. By contrast, the chess novice has no such experience
to draw from, so his ability to remember and analyze new chess
positions effectively is comparatively weak. Similarly, for trademarks,
repeated exposure to trademarks gives consumers a frame of
reference in which to place new marks. Someone already familiar
with how producers use marks will understand quickly how to make
sense of new marks and their relationship to existing ones. By
contrast, someone who knows little about marks and their use will be
easily confused."
Third, experience helps consumers generate new knowledge
about products, both consciously and unconsciously. Psychological
studies have shown that people subconsciously acquire knowledge
about the systematically organized patterns they are exposed to, even
if they are completely unaware that any organized pattern exists. 2 0 in
particular, their ability to act on the basis of that pattern actually
increases with exposure to the pattern, even though they have no
conscious awareness of learning or improvement. 261 This suggests that
people will get better at responding to subtle cues about trademarks
with repeated exposure to marks-precisely the kind of exposure that
begins with early childhood and continues into adulthood. They will,
whether consciously or unconsciously, learn to predict how producers
signal their use of a trademark, how trademarks can be distinguished,
and how to determine just what those trademarks mean.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, consumers will change
their search strategies to make them more effective. To be sure,
258. See Shanteau, supra note 255, at 254 (arguing that chess masters perceive patterns
of play and remember positions better than novices do).
259. See Johnson & Russo, supra note 238, at 549 (stating that experienced consumers
are better able to make good decisions by focusing on the information most predictive of
product performance); Mita Sujan, Consumer Knowledge: Effects on Evaluation Strategies
Mediating Consumer Judgments, 12 J. CONSUMER RES. 31, 43-44 (1985) (writing that,
compared to novice consumers, expert consumers make more effective use of prior
knowledge when evaluating new products).
260. See, e.g., Pawel Lewicki, Maria Czyzewska & Hunter Hoffman, Unconscious
Acquisition of Complex Procedural Knowledge, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 523, 523 (1987).
261. Id. at 529.
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consumers at any given time use ingrained, habitual search strategies
that System 1 executes, and System 1 continues to use and reinforce
them as long as the strategy works. 262 However, when System 1 makes
an error or encounters an unfamiliar situation, System 2 steps in to
figure out a search strategy that avoids the problem. 263 If System 2
comes up with a successful strategy, our consumer will plan to use this
strategy the next time he is in a similar situation. This may require
effort, for ingrained, familiar behavior can be difficult to change.
However, if this new strategy proves successful, the consumer will use
it more and more frequently until System 1 adopts it as routine. 26 The
end result is a change in consumer behavior brought about by
adaptation to the trademark "puzzle."
The interplay between System 1 and System 2 reveals how
modest confusion plays a vital role in helping consumers develop
important cognitive skills. In order for our trademark system to work,
consumers must gain two crucial skills. First, they need the ability to
identify and distinguish between trademarks. Second, they must be
able to receive and understand the subtle messages conveyed by
trademarks. Both of these skills develop because consumers
experience confusion. Inexperienced consumers make mistakes
because they fail to perceive distinctions between marks or do not
understand the informational significance of perceived features of
marks. Consumers experience these problems as confusion that arises
when using System 1, but that confusion spurs System 2 to create
solutions that ultimately improve the performance of System 1 andby extension-our trademark system.
Consider an analogy to the reading of written texts. Like
trademarks, written texts often have obvious meanings as well as less
obvious, subtle ones. Indeed, the majority of our society's most
important and communicative texts fit this general description.
Because writers use texts to convey information explicitly and
implicitly, our system of written texts cannot function at its highest
level unless readers have the ability to identify and distinguish similar
words (such as "there" and "their" or "affect" and "effect") and
understand the varied and subtle meanings conveyed when those
words are strung together. Of course, people are not born with the
ability to read effectively. Instead, people develop as readers by being
exposed to textual challenges that confuse them and by learning from
262. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
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the experience. For example, early readers learn first to sound out
words, letter by letter, before progressing to whole-word reading and
then more advanced, fluent comprehension.2 65 Over time, this process
creates the sophisticated reader with the vocabulary and
comprehension skills that our system of written texts requires. 266
The same can be said for trademarks. Unless consumers
encounter challenging (i.e., confusing) trademark situations, they will
not develop into sophisticated "readers" of trademarks. It may be
tempting to use trademark law for the purpose of simplifying
trademarks to the point that consumers can rely solely on System 1 to
comprehend all of the information that trademarks convey. 267 It is, of
course, highly questionable whether such an effort would succeed.
However, if it did, the result would be consumers who lack the ability
to identify and distinguish trademarks or comprehend the messages
that trademarks convey. By contrast, exposing consumers to
occasional trademark confusion will activate the use of System 2 to
resolve confusion and, over time, teach System 1 to deal with such
complexity automatically and routinely. In short, society benefits
from allowing confusion to develop sophisticated "readers" of
trademarks, just as society benefits from allowing confusion to
develop sophisticated readers of written texts.
The foregoing generally explains how confusion plays an
important and constructive role in our trademark system. At the very
least,. modest confusion concerning trademarks actually helps
consumers avoid confusion by helping them develop valuable
265. See Kerry A. Chalmers & Jennifer S. Burt, Phonological and Semantic
Information in Adults' Orthographic Learning, 128 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 162, 171-73
(2008) (concluding that adults learn new words in a manner similar to children); Anne E.
Cunningham, Accounting for Children's Orthographic Learning While Reading Text: Do
Children Self-Teach?, 95 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD. PSYCHOL. 56, 56-57 (2006)
(confirming the hypothesis that children learn to recognize words incidentally while
reading independently); Anniek Vassen & Leo Blomert, Long-Term Cognitive Dynamics
of Fluent Reading Development, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD. PSYCHOL. 213, 225-26
(2010) (asserting that children become better readers over time by initially decoding words
letter by letter and gradually developing more efficient reading strategies that include
whole-word recognition).
266. See Chalmers & Burt, supra note 265, at 163 ("[O]rthographic representations are
then consolidated and re* ned over many reading exposures to support highly *uent lexical
processing."); Peter A. Schreiber, On the Acquisition of Reading. Fluency, 12 J. OF
READING BEHAV. 177, 182-83 (1980) (arguing that readers acquire fluency by repeated
readings of challenging texts and improve fluency by, among other things, developing
strategies to compensate for the lack of prosodic cues in written texts).
267. Courts arguably succumb to this temptation when they use trademark law to
shield consumers from confronting and sorting out multiple meanings associated with
trademarks. See supra Part I.B.
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cognitive skills that make distinguishing and understanding
trademarks possible. This process of education occurs over the
consumers' entire lives and, although individual instances of
confusion may be challenging and costly to overcome, the intellectual
habits developed become ingrained to the point that System 1 uses
them effectively as "second nature," allowing consumers to avoid
confusion more easily in the long run.268 More importantly, in some
cases, increased consumer abilities actually improve our trademark
system by making it possible for the system to transmit more
information to consumers more efficiently. 269 We can see these
beneficial effects arise in a number of areas where modest confusion
persists.
A.

Protectionof Marks Lacking Inherent Distinctiveness

Let us return again to the protection of marks that lack inherent
distinctiveness. If producers used trademarks only to convey identity,
there would be relatively little reason to protect marks that lack
inherent distinctiveness because inherently distinctive marks can
identify producers more effectively and with fewer social costs.
As noted earlier, consumers instantly recognize inherently
distinctive marks as source identifiers.2 7 0 Protecting these marks
makes sense because they are very good at helping consumers make
the desired associations between producers and their products.
Consumers immediately know that they are dealing with a source
identifier, so they do not consider the possibility that the mark is
simply a descriptive term or a product feature. The connection
between producer and product therefore emerges quickly and with a
low possibility of error.
By contrast, the case for protecting marks that lack inherent
distinctiveness is much weaker. Consumers do not normally regard
descriptive words, colors, odors, or other product features as source
identifiers.27 1 Accordingly, these marks do not always create the
desired association between producer and product because consumers
must consider the possibility that they are dealing with something
other than a trademark. For example, as noted earlier, consumers
268. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
269. Deven Desai has also suggested reforming trademark law in order to increase the
flow of information in markets. See Desai, supra note 114, at 2124-29 (arguing, from the
perspectives of information theory and network theory, that proper reform of trademark
law will increase the information available in marketplaces).
270. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
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may not immediately understand that a "Safari hat" is a product sold
by a particular manufacturer, instead of a hat designed for hunting
trips in Africa. This raises a real possibility of error.
Moreover, even if consumers figure out that they are dealing
with source identifiers, marks lacking inherent distinctiveness also
frequently embody characteristics that consumers value for reasons
other than source identification. A scent, color, or decorative fabric
pattern may be aesthetically pleasing. Distinctive product
configuration also may have functional significance that affects the
quality of the good. This makes trademark protection socially costly.
If the proposed mark is a word, then there is the risk that the
trademark holder will prevent or hinder competitors from using the
same word to convey non-source-related information about similar
goods.272 If the proposed mark is a product feature, we must worry
that trademark holders will prevent competition-not in information
about goods, but in the goods themselves.27 3 For example, if a bicycle
maker somehow gets protection for the color of its bikes, no one else
can sell bikes in the same color. If consumers are indifferent to bike
color, this may pose no problem. But if consumers prefer bikes in the
trademark holder's color (perhaps because consumers find the color
attractive or valuable for being seen in traffic), then the trademark
holder will face reduced competition for its goods and can raise its
prices.
The foregoing shows that there are good reasons to protect only
inherently distinctive marks, for those marks convey the simple
identity of a producer more effectively and at lower social cost than
marks lacking inherent distinctiveness. Nevertheless, trademark law
protects both kinds of marks and for good reason. Subtle messages
that producers want to convey often lend themselves to marks that
lack inherent distinctiveness. For instance, the red sole on the bottom
of a shoe associates the product and the producer with glamour and
sexiness.274 The label "Safari shoe" captures not only the general style
of the product, but also the mystery and adventure of African safaris.
If trademarks are to convey messages like this, then trademark law

272. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
273. Lunney, supra note 19, at 367-68, 485-87.
274. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 227 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that red outsoles on black high-heeled shoes "flaunt a
glamorous statement" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

128

[Vol. 93

will have to protect marks lacking inherent distinctiveness. This
protection of course requires exposing consumers to confusion.275
At first blush, one might think that this confusion impairs the
trademark system by causing error and delay in the identification of
producers. In truth, however, the confusion actually increases the
value of the system by helping consumers develop cognitive skills that
support the transmission of subtle messages through trademarks.
Granted, consumers may experience occasional confusion when
confronted with new trademarks that lack inherent distinctiveness,
but working through that confusion is precisely how consumers learn
that descriptive terms and product features are sometimes used as
source identifiers.276 More importantly, confusion teaches consumers
to use context and other social cues to identify and comprehend
various messages encoded in trademarks. Once consumers learn these
skills, they become more fluent at them through repetition.
Eventually, responding to trademarks in a sophisticated manner
becomes second nature and routine, allowing our trademark system
-to carry more information than it would in the absence of exposure to
confusion.
B.

Private-LabelGoods

The case. of private-label goods offers a slightly different
illustration of how confusion improves the functioning of our
trademark system. Again, if trademarks exist only to distinguish one
producer from the other, it would make sense to force private-label
sellers not to use packaging that resembles name-brand packaging.
This would make the packaging of the two producers very easy to tell
apart and greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of mistaken
purchases. Of course, trademark law generally allows the use of
private-label packaging that resembles name-brand packaging,
exposing consumers to confusion. 2 7 ' However, there is a payoff for
this confusion, for it helps consumers develop the cognitive skills to
receive more information efficiently through the trademark system.
As courts have recognized, the point of private-label packaging is
to inform consumers that the private-label good is effectively identical
to the name-brand good. 278 The use of packaging that resembles
name-brand packaging clearly reminds consumers of the name brand,
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra notes 116-20
See supra notes 116-20
See supra note 125 and
See supra note 127 and

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
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but differences in packaging, such as a different product name and
label, inform the consumer that the producer of the good is not the
same. If trademark law forced private-label producers to use
packaging that did not resemble name-brand packaging, initial
consumer confusion would clearly be reduced. However, consumers
would also lose an efficient way of being informed about private-label
goods and their basic qualities. Consumers could, in theory, be asked
to read labels directly comparing private-label goods to name-brand
goods. However, reading these labels would be more cumbersome
and slower than looking for private-label packaging.
This is why it makes sense for trademark law to expose
consumers to confusion over private-label goods. Without question,
allowing the use of private-label packaging risks consumer error,
particularly when consumers hastily buy goods while on "autopilot."
Over time, however, consumers have discovered their errors, and
they have consciously learned how to avoid mistakes when
confronting private-label goods. Indeed, as Kahneman and others
predicted, consumers have adopted new cognitive strategies that are
now routine because of repetition and practice.279 This has greatly
reduced the likelihood of consumer error, and, more importantly, it
has given consumers the ability to receive information about the
source and qualities of private-label merchandise more efficiently
than they could if private-label packaging could not resemble namebrand packaging. In other words, it is again important to expose
consumers to confusion in order to develop the consumer skills that
allow our trademark system-and, by extension, markets-to
function efficiently.
C.

Fair Use

Fair use offers one more example of how confusion improves our
trademark system. The conflict addressed by this doctrine arises
because people sometimes give trademarks more than one meaning.
For example, in KP PermanentMake- Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,

Inc.,2" the plaintiff and defendant used "micro color" in two different
ways.28' The plaintiff used the term as a trademark identifying its
cosmetics, while the defendant used the term to describe its

279. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
280. 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
281. Id. at 114.
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cosmetics.2 82 Trademark holders understandably object to the
creation of unauthorized meanings for their trademarks. If successful,
their claims of infringement would not only deprive consumers of the
information conveyed by the defendants, but also would eliminate the
possibility of consumer confusion over the proper meaning to
attribute to terms like "micro color."
Trademark convention would generally regard the confusion
created by fair use as a social cost that permanently offsets the social
benefits of trademark law. Society benefits from allowing others to
use trademarks to fairly describe goods, but those gains must be
weighed against a permanent barrage of confusion that consumers
face when they encounter terms like "micro color" in varying
contexts. Closer reflection reveals, however, that trademark
convention is wrong and that confusion itself creates social benefits.
Once again, the key to seeing this conclusion comes from
consumer adaptation to confusion. Consumers may indeed be unsure
about the meaning of terms like "micro color," but this lack of
certainty will not lead to permanent confusion. Consumers who sense
uncertainty will devote conscious thought to figuring out exactly what
"micro color" means, and this effort will improve consumer resistance
to confusion in two ways. First, consumers will understand the
different ways in which "micro color" gets used, reducing the
likelihood of confusion over the use of this and similar terms in the
future. Second, consumers will become aware of and more attuned to
the contextual cues that signal when a term is being used as a source
identifier or a descriptor. This process is similar to the one that
enables consumers to recognize things that lack inherent
distinctiveness as trademarks, and it makes consumers resistant to
future confusion when they encounter trademarks used as plain
descriptors. In short, consumer adaptation to confusion increases the
value of our trademark system because it actually lowers consumer
susceptibility to confusion in the long run. This adaptation allows our
trademark law to permit descriptive uses of marks as fair use, and this
usage increases the amount of information consumers receive.
IV. PERSISTENT CONFUSION, TRADEMARK CONVENTION, AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM

The persistence of confusion in our trademark system and its
beneficial effects challenge modern trademark's embrace of the
282. Id. at 114-15.
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eradicate confusion norm. If, as modern trademark convention holds,
the eradicate confusion norm truly governs trademark, then the law
would diligently eliminate almost all confusion as pernicious to the
proper operation of markets. However, the persistent and ubiquitous
existence of confusion shows that trademark law conforms to modern
trademark theory sporadically at best. Instead of consistently
shielding consumers from confusion, trademark law frequently
accepts and even encourages behavior that exposes consumers to
confusion of the very sort that supposedly harms markets. This
exposes a meaningful gap between significant portions of trademark
law and modern trademark theory.
If modern trademark convention is correct in its assertion that
even modest amounts of confusion damage markets enough to
warrant a legal remedy,283 the gap between trademark law and
trademark theory should signal fairly considerable and observable
market harm. After all, consumers regularly confront multiple
meanings for marks, and trademark theory predicts that this
confusion should delay the satisfaction of consumer preferences.
However, this delay does not generally happen. Markets may not be
perfect, but consumers usually find what they want and learn to use
trademarks quite effectively, despite frequently encountering
confusion. This outcome implies that modern trademark theory's
claim about the danger of confusion is overstated, and that the value
of the eradicate confusion norm is much lower than trademark
convention would have us believe. Indeed, the relatively smooth
operation of modern marketplaces suggests that, as noted earlier,
modest amounts of confusion are not only relatively harmless but also
beneficial because they help consumers learn to avoid confusion in
the first place. 28 Trademark theory should therefore abandon the
283. See supra Part 1, notes 6-12 and accompanying text (describing trademark
convention).
284. Psychology experiments have measured delays in recognition of trademarks when
consumers in experiments are exposed to similar marks that are unlikely to confuse them
over the long run. These delays could correspond to or create delays for satisfaction of
consumer preferences, but the delays appear quite short, on the order of about 100
milliseconds. See Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 269 tbl.1 (2000)
(reporting that consumers experienced delays of 79 to 129 milliseconds in recognizing
Godiva chocolates after exposure to Dogiva biscuits). Rebecca Tushnet considers whether
these delays are serious enough to warrant legal intervention and concludes that they are
not, noting that consumers are quite good at distinguishing very similar marks on the basis
of clues provided by context. See Tushnet, supra note 33, at 527-32. This ability is precisely
the kind of cognitive skill that consumers develop when regularly exposed to modest levels
of confusion.
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eradicate confusion norm and replace it with a more nuanced
understanding of trademark law that improves the operation of the
trademark system by appropriately exposing consumers to modest,
manageable amounts of confusion.
Implementing this change requires the conscious balancing of
market disruption caused by confusion against market improvements
that arise because exposure to confusion makes consumers better at
avoiding confusion and at understanding subtle messages conveyed
through the trademark system. In some cases, this balance will clearly
favor the use of trademark law to prevent confusion. Consider a
typical dispute in which the defendant and plaintiff use identical or
nearly identical marks on similar, directly competing goods.285 In this
situation, the harm to markets is clear and substantial. Consumers
surely will not know whether the defendant or plaintiff makes the
goods in question, and it is therefore likely that many mistaken
purchases will be made. More importantly, the hypothesized facts
indicate that the benefits associated with exposing consumers to
confusion are unlikely to materialize. Because the two marks are
identical and used on directly competing merchandise, consumers will
find it difficult to come up with an effective strategy for accurately
identifying the manufacturer. Without such a strategy, System 2
cannot help System 1 learn to quickly and reliably identify producers,
making the benefits of increased consumer skill elusive. In short, the
harm of exposing consumers to confusion surely outweighs the
benefits of doing so.
. In other cases, particularly when consumers are likely to resolve
confusion on their own, the balance comes out very differently. For
example, when the defendant and plaintiff use similar but
distinguishable marks,286 the harm to markets becomes far more
speculative because consumers will probably distinguish between the
285. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 950, 954
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that infringement occurred where the plaintiff and the defendant
used "THIRST-AID" for beverages); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d
366 (7th Cir. 1976) .(finding infringement where the plaintiff and the defendant used
"Eveready" and "Ever-Ready" on flashlights, lamps, and bulbs); Aveda Corp. v. Evita
Mktg., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Minn. 1989) (finding infringement where the plaintiff
and the defendant used "Aveda" and "Avita" on hair products).
286. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256-57 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding infringement where the plaintiff used an image of a flying horse and the
defendant used the word "Pegasus" within the petroleum industry); E. & J. Gallo Winery
v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 459-60 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding
infringement where the plaintiff and the defendant used "Gallo" and "Gallo Nero,"
respectively, in marketing for wine).
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two producers successfully. Consumers may experience momentary
confusion and incur search costs to overcome it, but that confusion
does not disrupt markets as badly as mistaken purchases from the
wrong manufacturer would. More importantly, in cases where
consumers figure things out for themselves, exposure to minor
confusion will probably improve consumer abilities, leading to less
confusion and a better-functioning trademark system over the long
run. Whenever a consumer encounters confusion and successfully
overcomes it, her System 2 has come to the aid of System 1 by
creating a strategy for getting the information the consumer needs.
Over time, System 1 learns to execute the strategies created by
System 2 automatically, making the consumer more astute when
encountering similar marks. Accordingly, it seems likely that the
benefits of exposing consumers to low levels of confusion outweigh
the modest and speculative harm that this confusion may cause.
The confusion that persists in our trademark system and the
associated benefits suggest that trademark law already implements
the balance proposed here in many important areas?.7 In other areas,
however, trademark law seems to have paid insufficient attention to
the relationship between this balance and the proper functioning of
our trademark system. These areas offer meaningful opportunities for
reform.
Consider the cases in which courts base infringement on a
plausible but somewhat speculative possibility of confusion. 88
Trademark convention states that these decisions improve our
trademark system by making it even easier for consumers to avoid
confusion.289 Perhaps most consumers can tell the difference between
Beer Nuts and Brew Nuts, 21 but a few consumers will have difficulty
doing so, and it makes conventional sense to follow the eradicate
confusion norm because that norm will reduce the overall number of
confused consumers.
The benefits of exposing consumers to modest confusion suggest
that cases like Brew Nuts were wrongly decided. Over the long run,
there is reason to doubt whether preventing modest confusion of the
sort created by the simultaneous use of "Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts"
really helps markets function more effectively. In situations where
two marks can be distinguished with a modest amount of attention,
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra Parts II-III.
See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
See supranote 101 and accompanying text.
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consumers are quite adaptable. They can easily learn that Beer Nuts
and Brew Nuts are similar products made by different producers, or
they can learn that there is only one maker of nuts whose name refers
to beer. The specific lesson learned greatly affects how consumers
behave, especially when reinforced by other cases with similar results.
If consumers learn that the difference between "Beer Nuts" and
"Brew Nuts" has no commercial significance, they will learn to ignore
that difference and others like it. This eventually will make consumers
relatively insensitive to easily perceptible differences between marks,
and this insensitivity will render consumers susceptible to becoming
confused whenever they see marks that evoke similar associations. By
contrast, if consumers learn that Beer Nuts and Brew Nuts are
different, they will learn that modest differences between marks
matter. If trademark law consistently reinforces this lesson in similar
cases, consumers will become sensitive to this degree of difference
and will become less susceptible to confusion in the future. This
sensitivity will improve the operation of markets in two ways.
First, more information will flow through the trademark system.
consumers
learn that "Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts" are effectively
If
identical, then trademark law will prevent competitors of Beer Nuts
from calling their products "Brew Nuts" or any other similar name.
This protection makes it hard for more than one nut producer to
quickly inform consumers that its nuts go well with beer. It increases
the risk that consumers will not know valuable information about the
products they buy, hampering the prompt satisfaction of consumer
preferences. Conversely, if consumers learn to differentiate between
marks like "Beer Nuts" and those like "Brew Nuts," then trademark
law has no reason to intervene because consumer confusion will not
exist. This allows many rival producers to use "Beer Nuts," "Brew
Nuts," "Lager Nuts," or any other reference that informs consumers
that their nuts go well with beer. This association provides valuable
information to consumers and improves the operation of markets
because consumers can more easily understand the nature of products
they encounter.
Second, markets will avoid the confusion and disruption that
accompany trademark judgments. As noted earlier, any finding of
trademark infringement both reduces and creates consumer
confusion.29 1 Some consumers will have no trouble distinguishing
"Beer Nuts" from "Brew Nuts," and some of those consumers will
291. See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
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look for "Brew Nuts" as their preferred brand of nuts. If a court finds
the use of "Brew Nuts" infringing, the losing defendant must stop
using the mark and rebrand its products. Those consumers who
preferred "Brew Nuts" will be frustrated because they cannot use
"Brew Nuts" to find the product they want to buy. Indeed, they will
remain confused until they discover and learn whatever new mark the
maker of "Brew Nuts" decides to use on its product. However, if
trademark law teaches consumers to distinguish between marks like
"Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts," the incidence of trademark
infringement will fall. This reduction will lower the amount of forced
rebranding, allowing consumers who prefer "Brew Nuts" to continue
buying their desired product without disruption. The market will
therefore operate more smoothly because consumers can immediately
satisfy their preferences.
Similar observations can be made about cases where aggressive
interpretations of confusion have been used to prevent satirical
depictions of trademarks. For example, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
292
Balducci Publications,
the plaintiff, Anheuser-Busch, sued the
defendant, Balducci, over a fake advertisement that appeared on the
back cover of Balducci's humor magazine, Snicker.293 The fake
advertisement purported to promote a beer called "Michelob Oily,"
and it was intended to make a sly reference to an oil spill in the
Gasconade River-a source for the water used in Anheuser-Busch's
beer.2 94 To support its claim, the plaintiff introduced the results of a
survey indicating that consumers did not recognize that Balducci's
work was a humorous fake.295 Slightly over half of the survey
respondents thought that Balducci needed Anheuser-Busch's
permission to use its logos and trademarks. 29 6 Six percent thought the
advertisement was authentic. 297 Nevertheless, the district court
rejected Anheuser-Busch's claim and found that no infringement
existed.2 98 However, the Eighth Circuit reversed. 299
Leaving aside the significant problems about reliability and
objectivity that plague surveys prepared for litigation, the Eighth
Circuit's decision makes sense only under a very expansive view of
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 771-72.
Id.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 779.
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confusion. It may be appropriate for trademark law to shield
consumers from indistinguishable fakes, but here consumers did not
generally accept the defendant's advertisement as authentic because
only six percent of the survey responses reflected this kind of
confusion. Granted, the finding of infringement against Balducci
protected a small number of consumers from confusion, but it is not
at all clear that doing so benefitted our trademark system.
The very premise of parodies and satires like Balducci's is the
point driven home by the viewer's recognition of the fake as
resembling the original. The viewer of the advertisement briefly
entertains the possibility that he is looking at an original, but then
figures out that it is a fake conveying a humorous message about the
original. This process means that every parody operates on a form of
confusion that trademark law arguably should remedy. However, if
trademark law remedies this confusion, it will become very difficult to
create effective parodies and satires because the necessary moment of
confusion will become evidence of trademark infringement. Once the
trademark system makes this change, fewer and fewer parodies and
satires will be published, and consumers will have fewer and fewer
reasons to develop, use, or maintain the cognitive skills that enable
their identification and appreciation of parodies. This will make
consumers even more prone to confusion, and over time the art form
will wither because the law prohibits producing it. Instead, if courts
permit the publication of fake advertisements like Balducci's, a few
consumers will surely face immediate confusion. However, consumers
will also eventually develop the ability to recognize parodies and
satires, making them less prone to confusion in the future. This will
improve the operation of our trademark system by increasing the
amount of information available to consumers.
Of course, like all challenges to convention, the proposal made
here will meet objections. In particular, defenders of the eradicate
confusion norm will likely make two claims. First, they may argue that
consumers will not meaningfully adapt to confusion because they are
permanently susceptible to confusion. Time pressure, boredom, and
low involvement are permanent features of marketplaces that distract
consumers from the potentially meaningful features of trademarks.
Second, they may claim that the costs of any present confusion and
concomitant consumer adaptation outweigh any benefits that may be
gained. I think that both of these arguments are plausible but
insufficiently persuasive to truly support the eradicate confusion
norm.
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I agree that consumers frequently do not pay full attention when
shopping, but this lack of attention does not mean that consumers
cannot improve the skills they use when they are not paying full
attention. Consumer shopping behavior develops because it generates
results that consumers deem acceptable given their level of interest
and other constraints. If we allow consumers to occasionally face a
surprise, they will learn and adopt strategies that produce better
results. More important, the adaptations become automatic over time,
eventually becoming skills that can be executed routinely while
distracted. Indeed, this adaption is precisely what has happened in the
cases of marks that lack inherent distinctiveness and private-label
goods. 3
Furthermore, although there are costs associated with exposing
consumers to confusion, those costs have modest effects on the
operation of markets and are very much worth incurring. Remember,
a great deal of consumer learning happens during day-to-day
activities. 30 ' As long as the confusion encountered is reasonable,
consumers may buy the wrong products or have mistaken impressions
for a short while, but they will not make these errors for long. One
could take the position that the entire point of trademarks are to
relieve consumers of this very burden and that eliminating confusion
makes our trademark system work better. However, this argument is
shortsighted because it forgets that our trademark system's ability to
convey information is determined by the skills of the consumers who
participate in markets, and it is a good idea to have skilled, perceptive
consumers.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have identified the conventional wisdom that
trademark law exists to eradicate consumer confusion. I have further
argued that this goal rests on an incorrect understanding of the
relationship between consumer confusion and the effective
functioning of our trademark system.
Trademark convention embraces the elimination of confusion
because it wrongly believes that confusion has no constructive role to
play in our trademark system. It may be tempting to shield consumers
from all confusion in order to make their lives as easy as possible but
doing so is surely a mistake. Consumers cannot learn to identify and
300. See supra notes 270-79 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 248-64 and accompanying text.
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distinguish between trademarks without occasional exposure to
confusion. Shielding consumers from all confusion deprives
consumers of the very skills needed to function in modern markets. A
trademark system that truly eliminated all confusion would therefore
make consumers' lives harder, not easier. This insight enabled the
identification of many instances in which trademark law has pursued
the elimination of confusion too aggressively, at least in part because
trademark convention blinds courts to the constructive benefits of
modest confusion. All of this leads to the conclusion that confusion
has an important and constructive role to play in our trademark
system.
It is my hope that this insight will affect the future of trademark
in two ways. First, a new understanding about the effects of confusion
opens up opportunities for future scholarship. Perhaps psychologists
and educators can help us determine whether consumers are
particularly likely or unlikely to learn from certain forms of
confusion. Empirical work may also be possible to determine the
extent to which consumers exposed to confusion acquire stronger
cognitive skills.
Second, and more importantly, courts will hopefully recognize
the importance of confusion and change the way they understand and
interpret trademark law. Doing so may initially confuse consumers
who are presently inattentive and harm the commercial interests of
those who own trademarks. Over the long run, however, all of society
will benefit because consumers with improved cognitive skills can
better navigate modern markets in ways that support the
sophisticated and constructive use of trademarks.

